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This dissertation is composed of three studies. The first chapter examines the substitutability
between sex-selective abortions and postnatal gender discrimination. The second chapter explores
the relationship between parental son preference, level of female autonomy, and gender gaps in
child nutrition. The final chapter examines differences in spousal choices and intra-household
gender relations across different marriage types prevalent in India.
The first chapter tests whether sex-selective abortions have substituted for discrimination
against girls after birth. First, I identify the groups where the likelihood of sex-selective abor-
tions being used is the greatest and then check if these same groups have experienced increases in
girls’ health investments and outcomes. Results indicate that wealthy urban households exhibit the
largest sex ratio imbalance. This same group exhibits a relative increase in the duration of breast-
feeding for girls. In contrast, the biggest improvements in relative female postneonatal mortality
rates are observed in poorer rural households who are less likely to practice sex selection. Overall,
the results suggest that sex selection and postnatal discrimination are practiced by different groups.
The second chapter examines whether gender gaps in child nutrition are evident in the pres-
ence of parental son preference and then tests if this relationship varies with the level of female
autonomy. When mothers have a son preference, gender gaps in child nutrition are observed if she
is involved in making household decisions. In contrast, no independent association is found between
child nutrition outcomes and paternal son preference.
The third chapter examines differences in spousal choices and intra-household gender relations
across marriage types, which are categorized based on the extent of a woman’s say in the choice
of her partner. The results indicate that in arranged marriages, women are more likely to marry
iv
someone from the same caste and someone at least as educated as her. On the other hand, self-
arranged marriages are likely to take place between similarly aged individuals and individuals from
different castes. Furthermore, the greatest autonomy in decision making is found among women
involved in the choice of their spouse together with their parents rather than among women in
self-arranged marriages.
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Chapter 1
Sex-Selective Abortions and Gender Differentials in Child Health Investments
1.1 Introduction
There is a general consensus that household resources are allocated differently between male
and female children in India. This is evident from several studies which document the existence
of gender gaps in education, health and nutrition outcomes, and in mortality rates (Das Gupta
1987; Kingdon 2002; Oster 2009b; Pande 2003). More recently, researchers have sought to explain
increases in the male to female sex ratio, which has perpetuated the problem of ‘missing women’
in India.1 Since the sex ratio is found to vary by birth order and the sex composition of older
siblings, imbalances in this ratio have largely been attributed to the increasing use of prenatal sex
determination followed by the selective abortion of female fetuses.2 Both forms of discrimination,
sex-selective abortions and the neglect of female children, stem from a strong preference for sons
over daughters.3
This paper tests whether sex-selective abortions have substituted for discrimination against
1 The ‘natural’ sex ratio at birth is about 104−107 boys per 100 girls (Ganatra 2008). In contrast, estimates from
the Indian Census indicate that the sex ratio in the 0− 6 age group has increased from 105.8 in 1991 to 109.4 in 2011
(Jha et al. 2011). Almond and Edlund (2008) and Almond et al. (2009) have shown that such sex ratio imbalances
exist even among the children of Asian-Indian immigrants in the US and Canada.
2 Some direct evidence of use of sex-selective abortions comes from hospital or community based studies (Sachar
et al. 1993; Booth et al. 1994; Ganatra et al. 2001). However, given the paucity of nationwide direct estimates
of sex-selective abortions, most studies have analyzed the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) for indirect
indicators of the same (Arnold et al. 2002; Retherford and Roy 2003).
3 This son preference has evolved due to various social, cultural and religious reasons. For example, parents
perceive that it is more costly to bring up a daughter because they have to arrange for substantial amounts of money
as dowry payments for the daughter’s marriage but get little or no financial support in their old age from adult
daughters compared to sons. Readers may refer to Shepherd (2008) for a book length exposition on reasons for son
preference.
2girls after birth. Specifically, I examine whether the time periods and conditions associated with
a higher likelihood of sex-selective abortion are also associated with improvements in girls’ health
investments and outcomes. To identify the births that are most likely to be prenatally selected, I
examine changes in the proportion of male births, a proxy used in previous literature for the use
of sex-selective abortions. Then I examine the trends in gender gaps in postneonatal mortality,
breastfeeding duration and vaccination status in these same groups.
Goodkind (1996) was the first to suggest that sex-selective abortions could substitute for
postnatal gender discrimination. The basic idea of this ‘substitution hypothesis’ is that, with the
use of sex-selective abortions, girls who are most likely to have been postnatally discriminated are
terminated prenatally instead so we should observe an increase in the welfare of girls. He assessed
vital registration data in East Asia, a region where the existence of son preference has also been
documented. In Korea, sex-selective abortion was found to substitute for postnatal discrimination,
because even though sex ratio at birth increased, more female infants survived after birth. In
contrast, China experienced high female child mortality rates as well as a high prevalence of sex-
selective abortion, suggesting additive effects of sex-selective abortion. A recent study by Lin et al.
(2008) found that, in Taiwan, sex-selective abortions have led to fewer female deaths during infancy.
Shepherd (2008) is the first study to test the ‘substitution hypothesis’ for India by using data which
includes births till 1999. She found that sex-selective abortion is associated with increased gender
discrimination in neonatal mortality and vaccination rates but has no effect on gender gaps in
postneonatal mortality and treatment of diseases.
The issue of substitutability between sex selection and postnatal discrimination is much less
explored than the incidence of sex-selective abortions itself. This paper contributes to that strand
of literature in several ways.4 First, compared to Shepherd (2008), this study uses data from a
time when sex-selective abortion was more accessible to the population, improving the ability to
observe them. Second, the analysis includes breastfeeding which is an investment of maternal time,
4 In the process of preparing this manuscript for submission, I found a working paper by Hu and Schlosser (2010)
that was just posted in September 2010. The analysis in my paper and this working paper, despite the fact that they
are independent and concurrent work, are substantially similar and yield similar results.
3as opposed to mortality and vaccination which may be more dependent on income. Finally, to
facilitate the examination of substitution effects in the correct groups, the analysis here is stratified
by wealth status and urban-rural location of household, which influence access to prenatal tests,
abortion facilities and postnatal health care.
Consistent with previous literature, this paper finds increased proportion of male births in
higher birth orders in wealthy households, which indicates the use of sex-selective abortions. No
strong evidence of a change in relative investments between girls and boys is observed in these same
groups. An exception is found in rich urban households, where the duration of breastfeeding for
female children experienced a relative increase. Surprisingly, the biggest improvements in relative
female postneonatal mortality rates is found in poorer rural households who are less likely to
practice sex selection. The absence of strong substitution effects suggest that sex selection and
postnatal gender discrimination are practiced among different groups.
1.2 Sex Determination: Technologies and Policies
In India, abortions have been legal since the passage of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy
(MTP) Act in 1971. This law specifies who can seek abortion, the medical and social circumstances
under which an abortion can be performed, and requires abortions to be performed by registered
medical practitioners in certain approved facilities.5
Sex-selective abortion is the targeted abortion of female fetuses and is preceded by a test to
determine the sex of the fetus. Currently, there are three procedures that can be used for fetal sex
determination: amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling and ultrasound. The first two technologies
have been available since the 1970s (Arnold et al. 2002; Luthra 1994). Amniocentesis can be used
between 15 and 17 weeks while chorionic villus sampling can be used between 10 and 12 weeks to
determine the sex of a fetus. However, high costs of these procedures have restricted their usage to
very wealthy families (Po¨rtner 2009; Shepherd 2008). Introduced in the mid-1980s, ultrasound can
detect the sex of a fetus at the 20th week (Shepherd 2008). Because of it’s low cost relative to the
5 Readers may refer to Arnold et al. (2002) for more details on the MTP Act.
4previous two procedures, ultrasound is currently the most commonly used technique (Arnold et al.
2002; Ganatra et al. 2001).6 The low price accompanied by the portability of the ultrasound
equipment increased the reach of prenatal tests to a wider population and gradually extended the
availability of sex determination tests to remote and rural parts of India (Arnold et al. 2002;
Sharma et al. 2007).
The increasing availability of sex determination technologies and the selective abortion of
female fetuses triggered public debate and concern. Certain feminist movements started linking
sex selection to the issue of female discrimination, and more broadly, to human rights violation
(Gangoli 1998). Accordingly, in 1994, the Government of India passed the Pre-Natal Diagnostic
Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act (PNDT Act), imposing a nationwide ban
on the use of prenatal techniques to determine the sex of a fetus.7 The enforcement of this law,
however, has been poor (George 2002; Subramanian and Selvaraj 2009). Monitoring of private
laboratories and clinics has been lax and doctors have resorted to communicate the results of a
sex determination test verbally rather than in writing (Retherford and Roy 2003). Pressure from
the medical community has also prevented government officials from taking legal action against
doctors who are in violation of this law (Mudur 2006). Therefore, although illegal, problems with
enforcement and easy evasion of the PNDT Act have resulted in the rampant misuse of prenatal
testing methods for sex determination purposes.
1.3 Methodology
Since sex selection guarantees male births, the ‘substitution hypothesis’ put forward by Good-
kind (1996) predicts that girls who would have experienced the greatest postnatal discrimination
will be terminated prenatally instead and so we should observe more equitable investments between
male and female children. Using data from the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS) to test
this hypothesis, the first step is to identify births where the likelihood of sex-selective abortion
6 The typical cost of an ultrasound is in the range of $10 − $20 while the cost of an amniocentesis is double this
amount (Arnold et al. 2002). Chorionic villus sampling costs even more than an amniocentesis (Po¨rtner 2009).
7 The use of these technologies for prenatal care, however, continues to be legal.
5being used is the greatest. The next step is to examine whether the time periods and conditions
associated with a higher likelihood of sex-selective abortion are also associated with smaller gender
gaps in postneonatal mortality and child health investments.
1.3.1 Use of Sex-Selective Abortions
As a starting point, I use the time variation in access to sex determination technologies to
examine changes in the proportion of male births over time. The proportion of male births serve
as a proxy for the use of sex-selective abortions in the absence of direct nationwide measures of
the same.8 Using births of children as the units of analysis, I estimate a linear probability model
given by:
maleist = α0 + α1T1 + α2T2 + γs + ist (1.1)
where male is an indicator for the gender of child i born in state s in time period t. T1 and T2 are
the decades 1986 − 1995 and 1996 − 2005 and the excluded time period is the decade 1976 − 1985
(period T0). γs represents a vector of state fixed effects. The regressions are estimated by birth
order of child since a higher birth order implies that couples are close to their target family size,
which increases the probability of prenatally selecting the child. Urban-rural location and wealth
status of the household are factors that can alter the affordability and accessibility of prenatal
tests (Retherford and Roy 2003; Kishor and Gupta 2009). Therefore, regressions are also estimated
separately by location and wealth quintile of household.9 ,10
The coefficients of interest are α1 and α2, which give the difference in the proportion of male
births in time periods T1 and T2 relative to the baseline period T0. Although prenatal tests have
8 This proxy has also been used by Shepherd (2008).
9 In each of the three rounds, NFHS reports the wealth quintiles of households. Wealth indices are constructed
from information on ownership of household assets (such as furniture and vehicles), dwelling characteristics (such
as water source), home construction materials and whether a household member has a bank or post office account.
These composite indices are then categorized by quintiles (relative to households in each survey round), quintile 1
denoting the poorest households and quintile 5 denoting the wealthiest households.
10 Logit models are usually preferred when the dependent variable is binary. Because the models are estimated on
smaller subgroups (such as birth order 1 in households falling in wealth quintile 1 residing in urban areas), enough
observations are perfectly predicted that it becomes problematic to estimate the non-linear model in some cases.
Aggregating across the wealth quintiles, I have compared estimates of the linear probability and logit models and
find no substantial differences in significance levels or magnitudes of the estimated marginal effects.
6been available since the 1970s, sex-selective abortions became widespread only in the 1990s (Clark
2000). Based on this information, in the first decade (1976 − 1985), the sex ratio should be close
to the ‘natural’ ratio of about 104 − 107 boys per 100 girls. The second decade is when the use of
these technologies is starting to increase and the third decade is the most recent time period when
these technologies are highly diffused. Since diffusion of these testing methods positively correlate
to the use of sex-selective abortions, we would expect to observe an increase in the proportion of
male births over time.
The identification strategy rests on the premise that no changes occurred over the time of
higher spread of sex determination technology that would affect the proportion of male births
and differentially affect it at higher births orders. Alternate mechanisms suggested in previous
literature such as differential stopping behavior (Clark 2000) and Hepatitis B (Oster 2005) are
unable to explain increasing proportion of male births at higher birth orders.11 ,12 Similarly, if the
increased availability of prenatal testing methods now enable mothers to bring to full term more
male infants, who are more frail and more likely to die in utero than females, there is reason for
concern only if these improvements have different birth order effects. However, a study by Lin et al.
(2008) shows that this is an unlikely scenario.
1.3.2 ‘Substitution Hypothesis’
The next step is to examine trends in the gender gaps in postneonatal mortality and child
health investments over the time periods and conditions associated with high rates of sex-selective
abortion. First, I consider the incidence of postneonatal mortality, which refers to the death of an
infant from the end of the first month up to 11 months after birth (Shepherd 2008). I estimate the
following linear probability model.
zist = λ0+λ1T1+λ2T2+λ3(maleist×T0)+λ4(maleist×T1)+λ5(maleist×T2)+Xistφ+γs+ist (1.2)
11 Differential stopping behavior means that couples keep having children until they attain the desired number of
sons. Clark (2000) says that although these stopping rules can alter sex ratios within a family, this imbalance evens
out at the national level.
12 The study by Oster (2005) presents evidence that carriers of Hepatitis B virus have around 1.5 boys per girl.
7where z is an indicator which equals one if the child i born in state s in time period t died in
the postneonatal period and equals zero if the child survived. Maleist indicates the gender of the
child. T0, T1 and T2 are the three decades: 1976 − 1985, 1986 − 1995 and 1996 − 2005. Maternal
characteristics such as the level of education and age at childbirth are important factors affecting
children’s outcomes (Finlay et al. 2011; Shepherd 2008). These controls are included in X. State
fixed effects, given by the vector γs, are included throughout. As before, regressions are estimated
separately by birth order of child, urban-rural location and wealth quintile of household.
Of primary interest are the coefficients on the interaction terms, which give the gender bias
in mortality rates in the three time periods. If prior to the availability of sex determination tests,
unwanted female children were denied proper care and nutrition, it would have led to higher rates
of female deaths relative to male deaths. This would be indicated by a negative coefficient on the
(maleist × T0) term. With increasing use of sex-selective abortions, the ‘substitution hypothesis’
predicts a lowering of the gender gap in mortality rates and λ4 and λ5 would get close to zero.
Conditional on a child being alive, number of months for which the child is breastfed and the
vaccination status of the child are the other outcome variables of interest. The NFHS collected this
information only for recent births prior to the completion of each survey round and not for older
children. As a result, observations are limited to time periods T1 and T2 only and so a truncated
form of equation (1.2) is used to test the ‘substitution hypothesis’. This is given by:
vist = ω1 + ω2T2 + ω3(maleist × T1) + ω4(maleist × T2) +Xistφ+ γs + ist (1.3)
where the dependent variable vist denotes the health outcome of the child i born in state s in time
period t, either number of months for which the child is breastfed or an indicator which equals one if
the child is fully vaccinated between 12−23 months of age and zero if not.13 Maleist indicates the
gender of the child. X includes the same controls as in equation (1.2). γs is a vector of state fixed
effects. Again, regressions are estimated separately by birth order of child, urban-rural location
and wealth quintile of household. The method of estimation is ordinary least squares.
13 To be considered fully vaccinated, a child ought to have received seven vaccinations: three diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus (DPT) vaccines, three polio vaccines and one tuberculosis (BCG) vaccine.
8The validity of the ‘substitution hypothesis’ is tested by assessing the coefficients on the
interaction terms. If mothers are likely to breastfeed a male child longer than a female child or are
more likely to vaccinate a male child, it would show up as a positive value of ω3 in equation (1.3).
If substitution were to take place, the gender gap would reduce and ω4 would get close to zero.
The identification for the effect of sex-selective abortion on excess female mortality and
postnatal gender discrimination is based on the assumption that no changes occurred over the
period when high rates of sex selection are in place that would affect the health outcomes of males
and females differentially and have a differential impact at higher births orders.
1.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data come from the 1992 − 93, 1998 − 99 and 2005 − 06 rounds of the National Family
and Health Survey (NFHS) of India.14 This is a repeated cross-sectional, nationally representa-
tive dataset. Each survey round covered approximately 90, 000 ever-married women between the
ages of 15 − 49 , who were asked detailed questions on birth histories, health of children, and
fertility preferences. As with typical household surveys, this dataset also contains information on
basic household demographics, dwelling characteristics, household assets, and household member
educational attainment and employment status.
For purposes of this analysis, the unit of observation is an individual child. The information
from the birth histories of women is used to create a dataset of births in the 18 years prior to the
completion of each survey round, which are then pooled across the three survey rounds. Children
from multiple births and from birth orders higher than seven (above 95th percentile) are excluded
from the sample. So are children born to women who were visitors to the household. Certain
adjustments are also made regarding the observations from some states.15 The final sample
includes children born between 1976 and 2005. Since information on breastfeeding and vaccination
14 The NFHS data are available upon request from http://www.measuredhs.com.
15 Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal are three new states that were created in the year 2000. Observations
from these states are included in the original states they belonged to: Chhattisgarh was part of Madhya Pradesh,
Jharkhand was part of Bihar and Uttaranchal was part of Uttar Pradesh. The state of Sikkim was not covered in
the first survey round so observations from this state are dropped from the later rounds as well.
9status was collected only for very young children prior to the completion of each survey round,
the sample for analysis of these variables includes observations for children born between 1988 and
2005.
Table 1.1 reports maternal and household characteristics as well as the distribution of birth
orders of children. The sample size is 1,62,842 children from urban households and 3,42,816 children
from rural households. The birth order means indicate that observations are well distributed across
the four categories. As expected, mothers in urban areas are more educated and older at childbirth
than mothers in rural areas. Based on the wealth quintiles reported by NFHS for each survey
round, urban households fall disproportionately in the highest wealth quintile (quintile 5) while
rural households are primarily concentrated in the first three wealth quintiles.
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Urban Rural
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth Order
1 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44
2 0.28 0.45 0.24 0.43
3 0.18 0.39 0.19 0.39
4 + 0.22 0.41 0.31 0.46
Wealth Quintiles
1 /Poorest 0.02 0.15 0.25 0.44
2 /Poorer 0.06 0.23 0.24 0.43
3 /Middle 0.12 0.33 0.24 0.43
4 /Richer 0.29 0.45 0.19 0.39
5 /Richest 0.51 0.50 0.07 0.26
Age of mother at childbirth 24.17 4.73 23.85 5.09
Education of mother
No education 0.35 0.48 0.66 0.47
Some/Completed Primary 0.17 0.37 0.16 0.37
Some/Completed Secondary 0.36 0.48 0.16 0.37
Some/Completed Higher 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.12
N 1,62,842 3,42,816
A ratio of 104 − 107 girls per 100 boys is considered to be the ‘natural’ sex ratio at birth
(Ganatra et al. 2001). Higher sex ratios at higher birth orders are indicative of some human
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intervention, specifically the use of sex-selective abortions.16 To provide a snapshot of the time
variation used in this analysis, Table 1.2 reports the calculated sex ratios by birth order for the
three decades: T0, T1 and T2. In time period T0, in both urban and rural areas, sex ratios in all
birth orders are mostly found to be within the normal range. In period T1, sex ratios are found to
be higher in birth orders 2, 3 and 4+ in urban areas but no such birth order effects are apparent
in rural areas. In period T2, however, the increase in sex ratios in higher birth orders is apparent
in both urban and rural households. The observed patterns in sex ratios echo the findings from
Retherford and Roy (2003). These patterns are also consistent with the timing of availability of
prenatal testing methods in urban areas and rural areas.
Table 1.2: Calculated Sex Ratios at Birth by Birth Order
Birth Order 1 Birth Order 2 Birth Order 3 Birth Order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Urban Households
T0 106 107 108 106
T1 108 110 111 110
T2 105 113 110 111
Rural Households
T0 108 107 108 106
T1 106 107 107 107
T2 106 109 111 108
Notes: Sex ratios are calculated as the number of males per 100 females. The ‘natural’
sex ratio at birth is in the range of 104 − 107 boys per 100 girls. T0 includes births from
1976− 1985, T1 includes births from 1986− 1995 and T2 includes births from 1996− 2005.
These sex ratios have been calculated by aggregating across the wealth quintiles.
In this analysis, I look at three measures of postnatal child well-being: postneonatal mortality,
duration of breastfeeding, and vaccination status. Summary statistics for these outcome variables,
which are used to test the ‘substitution hypothesis’, are presented in Table 1.3. For all the three
outcomes, female children are found to fare worse than male children; this differential is more
pronounced in rural households. Another pattern that emerges is that, irrespective of gender,
children in rural households have higher mortality rates and lower vaccination rates compared to
16 Using the number of females per 100 males to define sex ratios, a recent study by Jha et al. (2011) estimated that
a 1 percent drop in the sex ratio among children under the age of 6 meant an additional 1.2 − 3.6 million abortions
of females.
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their urban counterparts. Finally, for all children, in both urban and rural households, mortality
rates and vaccination rates are lower, and duration of breastfeeding is higher in the most recent
time period, T2.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics of Postnatal Outcome Variables
Time period
Male Female
Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Urban households
Postneonatal Mortality T0 0.024 0.15 20,729 0.026 0.16 19,633
T1 0.017 0.13 40,906 0.019 0.13 37,597
T2 0.014 0.12 22,884 0.013 0.11 21,093
Breastfeeding Duration T1 14.42 9.86 5,567 13.69 9.24 5,116
T2 15.43 10.22 11,962 15.14 10.16 10,817
Vaccination Status T1 0.68 0.47 1,452 0.65 0.48 1,283
T2 0.67 0.47 2,958 0.66 0.48 2,666
Rural households
Postneonatal Mortality T0 0.037 0.19 48,702 0.042 0.20 46,034
T1 0.027 0.16 87,898 0.030 0.17 82,832
T2 0.019 0.14 40,044 0.021 0.14 37,306
Breastfeeding Duration T1 16.22 10.42 14,036 15.63 9.99 13,297
T2 16.86 10.80 22,288 16.13 10.31 20,464
Vaccination Status T1 0.47 0.50 3,558 0.42 0.49 3,526
T2 0.50 0.50 5,888 0.46 0.50 5,173
Notes: T0 includes births from 1976 − 1985, T1 includes births from 1986 − 1995 and T2
includes births from 1996 − 2005. These statistics have been calculated by aggregating
across the wealth quintiles.
1.5 Results
The first subsection presents results that help identify the births that are most likely to be
prenatally selected. The remaining subsections report results on the trends in gender differentials
in postneonatal mortality, breastfeeding duration, and vaccination status in these same groups.
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1.5.1 Trends in the Proportion of Male Births
Using the proportion of male births to proxy for sex-selective abortions, equation (1.1) aims
to examine changes in this proportion over the three time periods under analysis. The estimation
results for urban households are presented in Table 1.4. The regressions are estimated separately
by birth order of child and wealth quintile of household. In the first four wealth quintiles, there is
no discernible variation in the proportion of male births by birth order. In the fifth wealth quintile,
however, birth order effects are observed and these effects are found to be statistically significant
in both time periods, T1 and T2. In column (2), for example, which reports results for the second
birth order, the proportion of male births is found to be 1.4 percentage points and 3.3 percentage
points higher in periods T1 and T2 compared to the baseline time period T0. But, for the first birth,
there is no significant change in the proportion of male births over time.
Such patterns are also observed in rural households and are presented in Table 1.5. A higher
proportion of male births is observed in higher birth orders in wealth quintiles 4 and 5 but in period
T2 only. Although male births are also found to be higher in the second birth order in the third
wealth quintile, this increase is not observed in third and higher birth orders.
The results suggest that first births can still be considered a random event and parents wait
until subsequent births to sex select. The costs of prenatal tests and abortion facilities limits the
use of sex selection to richer households in both urban and rural areas who are able to afford them.
Overall, the results are consistent with findings from previous studies (Dubey and Verschoor 2007;
Kishor and Gupta 2009). Besides, the timing of the increase in male births in urban and rural
households is also consistent with the timing of availability of prenatal tests in those locations.
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Table 1.4: Proportion of Male Births: Urban Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 T1 -0.075 -0.027 -0.023 0.031
(0.047) (0.042) (0.049) (0.038)
T2 -0.12** -0.10** -0.047 0.056
(0.052) (0.047) (0.053) (0.040)
N 899 905 777 1,415
Quintile 2 T1 0.028 0.010 -0.061** -0.025
(0.029) (0.026) (0.031) (0.026)
T2 -0.0072 -0.053* -0.074** -0.015
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027)
N 2,397 2,313 1,914 3,081
Quintile 3 T1 0.028 -0.013 0.032 0.023
(0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.017)
T2 0.011 -0.028 0.011 0.017
(0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.019)
N 5,587 5,305 4,099 6,227
Quintile 4 T1 0.0015 -0.0059 -0.00076 0.0062
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
T2 0.0033 0.010 -0.019 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
N 14,281 12,962 9,278 12,289
Quintile 5 T1 0.0059 0.014* 0.013 0.019**
(0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0094) (0.0091)
T2 0.00075 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.028**
(0.0080) (0.0086) (0.012) (0.014)
N 30,484 25,794 14,450 13,750
Notes: Dependent variable is the gender of the child born (= 1 if male and = 0 if
female). Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are
reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 1.5: Proportion of Male Births: Rural Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 T1 -0.0036 -0.00046 -0.0025 0.013*
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0068)
T2 -0.0086 -0.010 -0.0054 0.00018
(0.010) (0.0099) (0.010) (0.0077)
N 20,553 20,402 17,670 33,922
Quintile 2 T1 -0.023*** -0.0037 -0.00010 -0.0049
(0.0087) (0.0086) (0.0096) (0.0071)
T2 -0.020** -0.0010 0.00071 -0.0084
(0.0096) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0083)
N 20,944 20,142 16,663 29,076
Quintile 3 T1 -0.0020 0.017** -0.0089 -0.011
(0.0079) (0.0080) (0.0090) (0.0071)
T2 0.0016 0.020** 0.0069 0.0037
(0.0094) (0.0095) (0.011) (0.0092)
N 22,175 20,965 16,806 25,898
Quintile 4 T1 0.0063 -0.0035 0.0055 0.0051
(0.0085) (0.0091) (0.010) (0.0084)
T2 0.0043 0.0013 0.024* 0.045***
(0.0100) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012)
N 19,871 17,901 12,982 17,478
Quintile 5 T1 0.0030 -0.013 0.017 0.019
(0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016)
T2 -0.0055 0.033** 0.078*** 0.066***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.023)
N 9,353 8,013 4,700 4,315
Notes: Dependent variable is the gender of the child born (= 1 if male and = 0 if
female). Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are
reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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1.5.2 Gender Differentials in Postneonatal Mortality
Before discussing the regression results, it is useful to review the summary statistics presented
in Table 1.3. These statistics reveal higher rates of female mortality than male mortality in urban
and rural households for the three time periods under analysis. For example, in period T0, 24 out
of 1000 male children and 26 out of 1000 female children died in the postneonatal period. The
corresponding numbers for rural households are 37 and 42 respectively. Over time, the mortality
rates for all children experience a decline, which is expected if, for instance, health facilities get
better and become more accessible.
The crux of the analysis is to examine if female mortality declines at a faster rate than male
mortality so as to reduce or eliminate the gender gap among the groups most likely to sex select.
Regression results from estimating equation (1.2) for urban households are presented in Table 1.6.
The regressions are estimated separately by birth order of child and wealth quintile of household.
Only the coefficients on the interaction terms, which indicate the average gender gap in mortality
rates in the three time periods, are reported. In wealth quintile 5, starting from an initial gender
gap in the third birth order in period T1 and in birth orders four and above in period T0, the gender
gap is found to disappear in period T2.
The results for rural households are reported in Table 1.7. There is some weak evidence of
closing of the gender gap in mortality in birth orders four and above in wealth quintile 4 and in
the third birth order in wealth quintile 5. However, the biggest improvements in relative female
mortality rates are observed in the first three wealth quintiles, where the biggest gender gaps in
period T0 were present.
If the ‘substitution hypothesis’ is supported, we would expect to find the largest reduction in
gender gaps in mortality in higher birth orders in richer households in urban and rural areas since
these are the groups where the likelihood of sex-selective abortions being used is the greatest. Since
that is not the case, the results for postneonatal mortality do not support the ‘substitution hy-
pothesis’.17 The biggest improvements in relative female mortality rates are found in poorer rural
17 The previous study by Shepherd (2008) also found no effect of sex selection on postneonatal mortality. However,
16
Table 1.6: Gender Differentials in Postneonatal Mortality: Urban Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T0 -0.015 0.0084 0.071** -0.014
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.027)
maleist × T1 0.014 -0.046** 0.024 0.019
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020)
maleist × T2 0.034** -0.017 0.016 -0.013
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013) (0.012)
N 826 855 743 1,341
Quintile 2 maleist × T0 0.014 -0.024 0.036* 0.0081
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020)
maleist × T1 -0.0096 -0.023** -0.0019 0.0029
(0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.0099)
maleist × T2 0.0050 0.0046 -0.017 -0.021**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.015) (0.0097)
N 2,250 2,207 1,841 2,936
Quintile 3 maleist × T0 -0.025* -0.0054 -0.0076 -0.015
(0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
maleist × T1 -0.000058 -0.00011 -0.0088 -0.0093
(0.0065) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0063)
maleist × T2 0.0080 0.0032 0.0032 0.00064
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0058) (0.0080)
N 5,295 5,091 3,970 5,962
Quintile 4 maleist × T0 0.011* 0.0074 -0.015* -0.0099
(0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0082) (0.0065)
maleist × T1 0.0019 0.0051 -0.0019 -0.0026
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0039)
maleist × T2 0.0014 0.0024 -0.000088 -0.0052
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0051) (0.0058)
N 13,667 12,581 9,011 11,857
Quintile 5 maleist × T0 0.0023 -0.0014 -0.00088 -0.0086*
(0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0045)
maleist × T1 0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0046* -0.0029
(0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0027) (0.0033)
maleist × T2 0.0035** 0.00091 0.0033 -0.0054
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0041) (0.0058)
N 29,645 25,273 14,145 13,346
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a child died in the postneonatal period (= 1 if died and
= 0 if lived). Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported
in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 1.7: Gender Differentials in Postneonatal Mortality: Rural Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T0 -0.0082 -0.0072 -0.013** -0.017***
(0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0051)
maleist × T1 0.0041 -0.0041 -0.0035 -0.012***
(0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0034)
maleist × T2 0.0068 0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0048
(0.0056) (0.0044) (0.0049) (0.0038)
N 18,994 19,281 16,792 32,031
Quintile 2 maleist × T0 0.00046 -0.00041 -0.0042 -0.0087
(0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0055)
maleist × T1 0.0090** -0.0060* -0.0012 -0.0054*
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0030)
maleist × T2 -0.0019 0.0025 0.0014 -0.0033
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0039)
N 19,513 19,152 15,942 27,636
Quintile 3 maleist × T0 0.0039 0.00074 0.000071 -0.015***
(0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0044)
maleist × T1 0.0042 -0.0053 0.000047 -0.0068**
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032)
maleist × T2 0.0058 -0.0076** -0.00078 -0.0064
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0047)
N 20,924 20,114 16,222 24,809
Quintile 4 maleist × T0 0.0041 -0.0025 -0.0031 -0.011**
(0.0046) (0.0043) (0.0046) (0.0043)
maleist × T1 0.0035 -0.00081 -0.0017 -0.0077**
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0036)
maleist × T2 -0.0018 -0.0040 -0.0066 -0.010*
(0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0058)
N 19,029 17,333 12,565 16,823
Quintile 5 maleist × T0 -0.0017 0.0040 -0.012* -0.0076
(0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0078)
maleist × T1 -0.0011 -0.00099 0.0036 -0.0081
(0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0047) (0.0062)
maleist × T2 0.0046 -0.0024 -0.0077 -0.0049
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0054) (0.011)
N 9,062 7,826 4,578 4,190
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a child died in the postneonatal period (= 1 if died and
= 0 if lived). Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported
in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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households who are less likely to practice sex selection, indicating that these gender gap reductions
are likely driven by other factors. A potential explanation is that as these households experienced
reductions in family sizes, their monetary constraints got reduced which allowed investments in
girls to increase. This is outlined in greater details in the discussion section.
1.5.3 Gender Differentials in Breastfeeding
The summary statistics from Table 1.3 indicate that, in urban households, in period T1, male
children are breastfed for an average of 14.4 months while female children are breastfed for an
average of 13.7 months. The corresponding numbers for children in rural households are 16.2 and
15.6 months respectively. The gender differential persists even in period T2, although all children
are found to be breastfed for a longer time than in period T1.
Before discussing the regressions results, it is useful to bear in mind the motives why mothers
might want to prolong the nursing period. Breastfeeding is considered to confer several benefits
to the child, for example, immunity against infectious diseases (American Academy of Pediatrics
2005). Limiting postnatal fertility is another reason why mothers might nurse infants for a longer
time (Jayachandran and Kuziemko 2011). Therefore, a gender gap in the duration of breastfeeding
might be observed if, either (1) mothers prefer to invest more in male children or (2) mothers are
more likely to stop having children after the birth of a boy (family size control motive).
Table 1.8 presents the regression results from estimating equation (1.3) for urban households.
In the richer households (wealth quintiles 4 and 5), in period T1, the coefficient on (maleist × T1)
is found to be positive in birth orders 3 and above. This implies that males were breastfed for
a longer time than females. But the gender gap disappears in time period T2. Since the gender
gaps disappear in the same time period where high rates of sex-selective abortions are in place,
and among births that are most likely to be sex selected, these results support the ‘substitution
hypothesis’. Such supporting evidence, however, is not found in Table 1.9, which reports the results
for rural households.18
the author but did not consider the urban-rural location split neither is her analysis disaggregated by wealth quintiles.
18 Mishra et al. (2004) and Jayachandran and Kuziemko (2011) have analyzed gender differentials in breastfeeding
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Table 1.8: Gender Differentials in Breastfeeding: Urban Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T1 2.22 -2.36 -0.85 2.31
(3.79) (3.76) (3.45) (2.26)
maleist × T2 -0.84 -1.50 0.74 -1.64
(1.86) (2.52) (2.17) (1.24)
N 169 161 171 324
Quintile 2 maleist × T1 -0.48 -0.031 3.15 -0.38
(1.68) (1.68) (2.17) (1.39)
maleist × T2 0.0035 0.68 3.22** 1.07
(1.10) (1.10) (1.54) (1.10)
N 464 466 385 670
Quintile 3 maleist × T1 -2.07* 2.50* 0.85 1.35
(1.19) (1.33) (1.50) (1.26)
maleist × T2 1.02 -0.90 0.29 -0.21
(0.68) (0.66) (0.92) (0.74)
N 1,203 1,173 821 1,174
Quintile 4 maleist × T1 0.37 0.65 1.35* 1.26*
(0.68) (0.69) (0.81) (0.72)
maleist × T2 0.35 1.20*** -0.17 0.057
(0.39) (0.43) (0.57) (0.60)
N 3,129 2,935 1,787 2,068
Quintile 5 maleist × T1 0.035 0.53 1.34** 2.11***
(0.37) (0.42) (0.62) (0.64)
maleist × T2 0.031 0.74** 0.28 1.26*
(0.28) (0.32) (0.53) (0.67)
N 6,668 5,436 2,392 1,866
Notes: Dependent variable is the duration (in months) for which a child is breastfed. Robust
standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 1.9: Gender Differentials in Breastfeeding: Rural Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T1 1.07** -0.040 0.64 0.76*
(0.54) (0.56) (0.63) (0.43)
maleist × T2 0.85* 0.24 1.56*** 0.55
(0.48) (0.42) (0.48) (0.34)
N 3,321 3,600 3,272 7,095
Quintile 2 maleist × T1 0.088 -0.28 0.43 0.45
(0.54) (0.52) (0.58) (0.48)
maleist × T2 -0.56 0.82* 1.60*** 0.59
(0.39) (0.42) (0.50) (0.37)
N 3,957 4,115 3,214 5,623
Quintile 3 maleist × T1 -0.16 0.56 0.49 1.26***
(0.46) (0.48) (0.56) (0.48)
maleist × T2 0.013 0.60 1.54*** 1.07**
(0.39) (0.39) (0.49) (0.44)
N 4,547 4,363 3,280 4,437
Quintile 4 maleist × T1 -0.053 1.39*** 0.57 1.36**
(0.39) (0.46) (0.59) (0.53)
maleist × T2 0.43 1.41*** 1.34** 0.74
(0.35) (0.38) (0.56) (0.60)
N 4,575 4,066 2,541 2,725
Quintile 5 maleist × T1 1.89*** 1.75** 0.37 0.91
(0.62) (0.76) (1.00) (1.11)
maleist × T2 0.93* 0.71 1.35 1.82
(0.52) (0.57) (0.90) (1.19)
N 2,164 1,788 832 570
Notes: Dependent variable is the duration (in months) for which a child is breastfed. Robust
standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
21
Surprisingly, in Table 1.9, a widening of the gender gap in rural households in the first three
wealth quintiles is observed in birth orders two and three from period T1 to T2. In birth orders 4 and
above, on the other hand, the gender gap is found to stay the same (quintile 3) or decrease (quintile
1). Out of the two motives for increased duration of breastfeeding mentioned above, the family size
control motive would be particularly important for women in these poorer rural households if they
have limited access to modern contraceptive methods. A potential explanation of the widening of
the gender gap is that after a boy is born, women would want to stop having children (by increasing
the nursing period) sooner if family sizes have fallen over the two decades. That could the reason
why the increased breastfeeding found in column (4) in time period T1 in now observed in birth
orders two and three in period T2.
The analysis above includes children who were being breastfed at the time of the survey. A
concern with including these observations is that the nursing period might not reflect the mother’s
preferences regarding breastfeeding duration. Therefore, as a check, I repeat the same exercise by
excluding these children and find that the results are robust to this exclusion (results available
upon request).19
1.5.4 Gender Differentials in Vaccination Status
From the summary statistics on vaccination coverage presented in Table 1.3, three patterns
are evident. First, in both time periods, vaccination coverage is higher for children in urban areas
than in rural areas. This is not unexpected since urban areas have greater access to modern medical
facilities. Second, although vaccination rates in urban areas remain virtually unchanged across the
two decades, these rates have increased for all children in rural areas. Lastly, a gender gap is
evident in vaccination coverage for children in rural households in both time periods but not in
urban households.
Regression results of equation (1.3) for urban households are presented in Table 1.10. There
but they do not examine the relation between sex selection and breastfeeding.
19 However, due to big reductions in sample size, these results are weaker.
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Table 1.10: Gender Differentials in Vaccination Status: Urban Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T1 -0.59* -0.28 0.59* 0.067
(0.32) (0.37) (0.30) (0.16)
maleist × T2 -0.32 0.13 -0.099 0.39**
(0.22) (0.33) (0.22) (0.15)
N 49 39 49 78
Quintile 2 maleist × T1 -0.22 0.18 0.052 -0.14
(0.18) (0.17) (0.23) (0.15)
maleist × T2 -0.12 0.10 0.059 0.17
(0.11) (0.12) (0.20) (0.12)
N 133 126 75 146
Quintile 3 maleist × T1 0.11 0.017 -0.071 -0.011
(0.10) (0.12) (0.16) (0.11)
maleist × T2 0.078 0.0072 -0.096 0.011
(0.068) (0.067) (0.093) (0.066)
N 288 267 192 260
Quintile 4 maleist × T1 -0.062 -0.012 0.016 0.043
(0.056) (0.071) (0.078) (0.078)
maleist × T2 -0.052 0.040 0.0046 -0.044
(0.037) (0.039) (0.057) (0.056)
N 795 729 442 511
Quintile 5 maleist × T1 -0.022 0.029 0.14*** 0.068
(0.031) (0.030) (0.053) (0.059)
maleist × T2 -0.020 -0.027 -0.0062 0.097
(0.022) (0.025) (0.050) (0.071)
N 1,693 1,439 585 463
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a child is fully vaccinated (= 1) or not (= 0). Robust
standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 1.11: Gender Differentials in Vaccination Status: Rural Households
Birth order 1 Birth order 2 Birth order 3 Birth order 4+
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quintile 1 maleist × T1 0.012 0.0048 -0.019 0.10***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.030)
maleist × T2 0.013 0.053 0.052 -0.0021
(0.040) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024)
N 868 935 847 1,704
Quintile 2 maleist × T1 0.014 0.14*** 0.025 -0.020
(0.045) (0.047) (0.050) (0.034)
maleist × T2 -0.013 -0.0087 -0.027 0.033
(0.036) (0.034) (0.042) (0.030)
N 1,063 1,070 808 1,404
Quintile 3 maleist × T1 -0.0098 0.14*** 0.047 0.013
(0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.044)
maleist × T2 0.0079 -0.0047 0.081* 0.078**
(0.033) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038)
N 1,249 1,130 886 1,090
Quintile 4 maleist × T1 0.074** 0.085** 0.14*** 0.031
(0.034) (0.042) (0.054) (0.049)
maleist × T2 0.0068 0.020 0.066 0.094*
(0.033) (0.037) (0.049) (0.053)
N 1,264 1,059 635 717
Quintile 5 maleist × T1 0.15*** 0.051 0.064 0.10
(0.052) (0.059) (0.078) (0.11)
maleist × T2 0.0089 0.091** 0.13* 0.23**
(0.036) (0.045) (0.077) (0.11)
N 548 486 232 150
Notes: Dependent variable is whether a child is fully vaccinated (= 1) or not (= 0). Robust
standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are reported in parentheses.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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is no clear evidence of a gender gap or variation in this gap over time. The only exception is in
the third birth order in wealth quintile 5, where a lowering of the gender gap is observed. The
absence of results suggests that vaccination is not being used as a means to differentiate investment
between male and female children in urban areas, which is not surprising since urban areas already
have high rates (about 67% of children) of immunization coverage.20
Table 1.11 reports the corresponding results for rural households. There emerge no clear
patterns in the movement of gender differentials in the vaccination status of children in the fourth
and fifth wealth quintiles, where sex selection is most likely to take place. Therefore, no conclusive
evidence in favor of the ‘substitution hypothesis’ is found from the results on vaccination status.21
1.6 Discussion and Robustness of Results
1.6.1 Discussion
This paper investigates if the welfare of girls has increased in higher birth orders in richer
households, where sex selection is most likely to take place. A relative increase in the duration of
breastfeeding of girls is found in higher birth orders in urban areas. However, no evidence in favor
of the ‘substitution hypothesis’ is found from the results on postneonatal mortality and vaccination
status.
Surprisingly, the largest reductions in relative female mortality rates are observed in poorer
rural households. Since the proportion of male births in these households has not increased over
time, it suggests a lower likelihood of sex selection being practiced among these groups. This is
likely due to the high costs of prenatal tests and abortion facilities. Therefore, the reductions in
20 Oster (2009a) used a theoretical framework to show that at low and high levels of access to health services there
is gender equality in child investments. It is only in the intermediate situation, when access is gradually increasing,
that gender disparities are observed. This is because as access increases, parents invest first in boys who are valued
more.
21 These results contrast the findings from Shepherd (2008) who showed that sex selection increased the gender
bias in vaccination rates of children in the same age group. However, she used data only from the first two rounds
of the NFHS and her analysis was not stratified by urban-rural location or wealth quintile of household. Mishra
et al. (2004) also analyzed gender differentials in vaccination status but do not examine the substitution between sex
selection and vaccination coverage.
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gender gaps must be attributable to some alternate mechanism. The explanation offered in this
paper is that these improvements could be due to falling fertility levels. Figure 1 shows that the
mean ideal number of children and the mean actual number of children reported by women in
poorer rural households (households in wealth quintiles 1, 2 and 3) have declined in each survey
round. When fertility was higher, monetary resources in these households were constrained enough
so that parents had to concentrate the bulk of these investments in male children who are the
preferred gender. Over time, as the number of children decreased, the constraints became relaxed,
which allowed investments in girls to increase.22
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Figure 1.1: This figure shows the mean ideal number of children reported by all women and the
mean actual number of children born to women with completed birth histories in each survey
round: NFHS 1 conducted in 1992−93, NFHS 2 conducted in 1998−99 and NFHS 3 conducted in
2005− 06. Observations are restricted to women in rural households in wealth quintiles 1, 2 and 3.
22 A study by Das Gupta and Bhat (1997) points out that falling fertility levels could increase postnatal gender
discrimination since parents might discriminate more at each parity in order to achieve their desired sex composition
of children within their target family size. This explanation would hold true if the couples’ desired number of children
declines at a faster rate than their target number of sons. However, Appendix Figure A.1 shows that, in fact, the
number of boys desired by mothers has declined at a faster rate than the ideal number of children.
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Overall, the results show weak evidence of substitutability between the two types of discrim-
ination: sex-selective abortions and postnatal gender discrimination. The absence of substitution
effects are likely because these are practiced among different groups – sex selection by richer house-
holds and postnatal discrimination by poorer households.
1.6.2 Robustness Checks
Previous literature has documented substantial regional variation in the use of sex-selective
abortions. In particular, the sex ratios in some states in northern India have been found to be
highly skewed (Arnold et al. 2002; Retherford and Roy 2003). Therefore, it might be instructive to
test the ‘substitution hypothesis’ in these states and check the trends in gender differentials in child
health investments. To conduct this analysis, I limit observations to four northern states: Punjab,
Haryana, Gujarat and Rajasthan. I find that the substitution results on postneonatal mortality
and breastfeeding are preserved and are robust to this subsample (results available upon request).23
All the regressions in this analysis are estimated separately by wealth quintiles of households.
These wealth quintiles, reported in the NFHS, are constructed from information on dwelling char-
acteristics and ownership of household assets. A potential source of concern is if parents’ choice
about investing in assets depends on the sex composition of their children. This would imply that
this measure suffers from an endogeneity problem. To get around this problem, I use membership
in a scheduled caste/scheduled tribe (SC/ST) community, who are traditionally the poorest in the
Hindu caste system, as an alternate indicator of economic status. As pointed out by Clark (2000),
who has previously used this measure, the caste indicator has two advantages: (1) The member-
ship in these communities is not endogenous to the fertility decisions of the household and (2) It
remains constant all through the birth history of a woman. After repeating the entire analysis
by dividing the urban and rural samples into SC/ST and non SC/ST households, I find that the
results are broadly similar to the results obtained from using quintiles of wealth (results available
23 The loss in sample size for vaccination status of children is severe enough that the models cannot be estimated.
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upon request).
1.7 Conclusion
Sex-selective abortion has provided parents a guaranteed means to avoid female births and
the increasing diffusion of this practice in the recent past is confirmed by the growing imbalance
in sex ratios. This paper tests if the welfare of girls have increased in groups where sex selection
is most likely to be used. The results indicate that the proportion of male births have increased in
higher birth orders in richer households, which suggests the use of sex-selective abortions in these
groups. However, no strong evidence of a change in relative investments between girls and boys are
observed in these same groups. The absence of such substitution effects suggest that sex selection
and postnatal gender discrimination are practiced among different groups.
Chapter 2
Son Preference, Female Autonomy, and Gender Gaps in Child Nutrition
2.1 Introduction
A large body of literature has confirmed that son preference, the mindset that sons are more
valuable than daughters, is pervasive among Indian parents.1 Frequently, researchers have deduced
the presence of son preference by examining its effects on behavior. Studies have shown that parents
who do not have the desired number of sons are less likely to use contraceptives, are more likely
to continue having children and have shorter birth intervals (Clark 2000; Haughton and Haughton
1998). An alternate approach has been to focus on the patterns of discrimination against girls.
This could be through the differential allocation of resources between male and female children,
which becomes evident from gender gaps in health and education outcomes (Subramaniam and
Deaton 1991; Kingdon 2002; Oster 2009b), or by selectively aborting female fetuses to ensure that
daughters are not born at all (Arnold et al. 2002; Kishor and Gupta 2009).
Spouses do not necessarily have identical preferences, an inference made in several studies
which have found that household outcomes vary with the identity of the decision maker.2 Barring a
few exceptions, most empirical studies have concluded that higher female autonomy or improvement
in a woman’s position within the household is associated with better child outcomes, for instance,
greater investments in child health and nutrition (Maitra 2004; Smith et al. 2003).3 These effects
1 There exist a number of economic, social and religious reasons for the evolution of these preferences. Readers
may refer to Shepherd (2008) for a book length exposition on reasons for son preference in India.
2 These studies reject the unitary model of household behavior which posits the existence of a representative
household member with a single preference function (Becker 1981).
3 Other studies have found that household and child welfare are maximized when spouses share the bargaining
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are not always gender neutral; the underlying implication being that parental preferences vary with
the child’s gender (Duflo 2003; Thomas 1990; Thomas 1994).
What is missing from the literature is how female autonomy influences the relationship be-
tween son preference and child nutrition outcomes. This paper seeks to examine precisely that
question. To conduct this analysis, data from the 2005 − 06 round of the National Family and
Health Survey are used. Rather than infer the existence of son preference from its effects on be-
havior, direct and separate measures for parents are created based on survey responses regarding
preferred number of boys and girls. The task of finding a satisfactory measure of female autonomy
has been challenging for researchers. Some studies have used proxies such as female education,
wealth or physical stature (Patel et al. 2007; Thomas 1994). The drawback is that these mea-
sures directly affect outcomes such as child’s health. To get around endogeneity problems, other
studies have looked at exogenous income shocks such as cash transfers (Duflo 2003; Paxson and
Schady 2007). But these studies frequently assume that the recipient of the income shock is also
the one who decides how to spend the money, which may not always hold true. A recent approach
has been to construct an index of female autonomy from survey questions on female involvement
in household decisions, freedom of mobility and control of resources (Chakraborty and De 2011).
But this too has come under criticism (Alfano et al. 2011) because answers to these questions
are weighted equally in the index even though the relative importance of decisions may well vary
with the outcome under study. The measure of female autonomy used in this analysis is based on
couples’ responses to the survey question on routine household purchases. Not only does this give a
direct measure, it also focuses on the question that is likely to be the most relevant for investments
in child nutrition.
The main findings from this analysis are as follows. Gender gaps in nutrition outcomes of
children are observed when mothers have a son preference and are involved in household decision
making. This suggests that mothers, who are primarily responsible for the nutrition needs of small
power (Lancaster et al. 2006; Patel et al. 2007). An exception is the study by Berman et al. (1997), who have found
that maternal employment is negatively associated with health care spending when children fall ill.
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children, are able to manifest their son preference when they have autonomy in making decisions.
In contrast, no independent association is found between child nutrition outcomes and paternal son
preference.
2.2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data come from the 2005 − 06 round of the National Family and Health Survey (NFHS), a
nationally representative cross-sectional household survey conducted in India.4 The advantage of
this latest round of the NFHS is that in addition to interviewing women, like in the previous two
rounds, men have also been interviewed.5 The survey contains detailed information on basic house-
hold demographics, dwelling characteristics, household assets, and household member educational
attainment and employment status. Adult men and women were asked questions about fertility,
fertility preferences as well as various aspects of female empowerment. Additionally, information
on anthropometry, health and nutrition of children in these households was also collected.
The sample for this analysis is restricted to children under five years of age residing in rural
households for whom complete anthropometric information is available and for whom both parents
have been interviewed. Children from birth orders higher than nine (above 99th percentile) are
excluded from the analysis.6 The final sample includes 6,897 children from 4,900 households.
The outcome of interest is the weight-for-height z score of a child, which is an anthropometric
measure used to assess a child’s short-run nutritional status.7 This measure is based on the World
Health Organization (WHO) growth standards. A z score is calculated, which is expressed as
standard deviations below or above a median value in the corresponding age and sex group in the
reference population (World Health Organization 2006). For example, a weight-for-height z score
of −0.5 would imply that a child’s weight-for-height is 0.5 standard deviations below the median
4 The NFHS data are available upon request from http://www.measuredhs.com.
5 The previous two rounds were conducted in 1992− 93 and 1998 − 99.
6 The rationale behind this exclusion is that children in birth orders higher than nine may have exceptionally
inferior nutrition outcomes and/or may be subject to greater gender discrimination when family sizes are so high.
Results reported in this analysis are robust to the inclusion of these observations.
7 Similar results are obtained for BMI-for-age, another short-run measure. However, no significant results are
obtained for height-for-age, which is a long-run indicator of nutritional status.
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weight-for-height of a well-nourished child.
Table 2.1 reports the characteristics of children, who form the units of observation in this
analysis. The sample size is 3,454 female children and 3,443 male children. The average child is
approximately 30 months old. The mean weight-for-height z scores of female and male children
are −0.95 and −0.94 respectively. The negative signs indicate that the z scores of children in this
sample fall below the median score of a well-nourished child. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of z
scores by gender. It can be seen that female children fare slightly worse than male children, a fact
also apparent from their lower mean z scores reported in Table 2.1.8 The difference, however, is
not statistically significant.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of weight-for-height z scores of children
Table 2.2 illustrates the sample characteristics of parents and households. The average
mother’s age is 27 years while the average father is 32 years old. The fathers’ and mothers’
average educational attainment are 6 years and 4 years respectively. 41 percent of mothers and 97
percent of fathers report to have worked in the last twelve months. The NFHS asked questions
on the ideal number and ideal sex composition of children to elicit information on the fertility
preferences of parents. The mean ideal number of boys and girls reported by mothers are 1.56 and
1.21 respectively which adds to 2.77, their mean ideal number of children. Fathers report their
8 The use of z scores makes gender comparisons possible since they are adjusted for a child’s age and gender.
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of Children
Female Male
Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Weight-for-height z score -0.95 1.25 -0.94 1.31
Age (months) 30.02 16.86 30.74 16.97
Birth Order
1 0.25 0.22
2 0.26 0.26
3 0.18 0.20
4+ 0.31 0.32
N 3,454 3,443
Table 2.2: Parental and Household Char-
acteristics
Mean S.D.
(1) (2)
Mother Characteristics
Age 27.20 5.71
Education 3.67 4.38
Worked in last year 0.41
Ideal no. of children 2.77 1.00
Ideal no. of boys 1.56 0.66
Ideal no. of girls 1.21 0.55
BMI 19.67 2.82
Father Characteristics
Age 32.23 6.56
Education 5.92 4.75
Worked in last year 0.97
Ideal no. of children 2.75 1.02
Ideal no. of boys 1.57 0.70
Ideal no. of girls 1.18 0.56
Household Characteristics
Wealth Quintile
1 0.25
2 0.28
3 0.25
4 0.16
5 0.06
Religion
Hindu 0.73
Muslim 0.10
Christian 0.13
Others 0.04
Male household head 0.95
Total no. of children 3.18 1.87
Number of households 4,900
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ideal number of boys and girls to be 1.57 and 1.18 respectively, adding up to 2.75 ideal number of
children. Based on wealth quintiles reported by NFHS for the entire survey sample, the majority
of the households in this sample fall in the first four wealth quintiles and only 6 percent of the
total 4,900 households fall in the highest wealth quintile.9 Majority (about three-quarters) of the
households belong to the Hindu community and the household is headed by a male member in 95
percent of the sample. The average number of children in these households is 3.18.
2.3 Measuring Son Preference
The term son preference refers to “the attitude that sons are more important and more
valuable than daughters” (Clark 2000, p.95). The NFHS includes questions on the ideal number
and ideal sex composition of children which are asked to both parents. Specifically, the two questions
asked to obtain information on fertility preferences are: (1) “If you could go back to the time you
did not have any children and could choose exactly the number of children to have in your whole
life, how many would that be?” and (2) “How many of these children would you like to be boys
and how many would you like to be girls?” A point to note is that because of the manner in which
these questions have been framed, they are more likely to capture innate preferences rather than
dynamic ones that could evolve due to factors such as the sex composition of children already born.
Separate measures of son preference for each parent are derived from their responses to the
second question mentioned above. Using information from a parent’s report on the number of boys
and girls they would ideally like to have, son preference is calculated as a binary variable. If the
ideal number of boys reported is greater than the ideal number of girls, then this measure has a
value of one and implies that the parent has a son preference. This measure has a value of zero if
the ideal number of sons is less than or equal to the ideal number of daughters.10
9 NFHS reports the wealth quintiles of the surveyed households. Wealth indices are constructed from information
on ownership of household assets (such as furniture and vehicles), dwelling characteristics (such as water source),
home construction materials and whether a household member has a bank or post office account. These composite
indices are then categorized by quintiles (relative to households in the survey round). Quintile 1 denotes the poorest
households and quintile 5 denotes the wealthiest households.
10 Consider for example, three mothers each of whom report their ideal number of children to be four. Suppose
that the first mother wants three boys and one girl, the second mother wants two boys and two girls and the third
mother wants one boy and three girls. Then only the first mother is designated to have a son preference.
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A related measure has been used by Clark (2000); the ratio of ideal number of sons to the ideal
number of children, where a higher ratio implies a greater preference for sons. This measure makes
it possible to assess differing magnitudes of son preference. Due to a much smaller sample size
(about 6 percent of the sample size in Clark (2000)) in this analysis, there is not sufficient variation
that can be exploited to use such a measure. Instead, the binary measure of son preference used
can be conceived as an aggregated version of Clark’s measure where parents who would like more
than 50 percent of their children to be boys are designated as those with a son preference.
Table 2.3: Distribution of Parental Preferences
Father has son preference
No Yes Total
(1) (2) (3)
Mother has son preference
No 2,318 932 3,250
(71.32) (28.68) (100.00)
[72.71] [54.44] [66.33]
Yes 870 780 1,650
(52.73) (47.27) (100.00)
[27.29] [45.56] [33.67]
Total 3,188 1,712 4,900
(65.06) (34.94) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Notes: Son preference for either parent is calculated as a binary variable which
equals one if the parent reports that their ideal number of boys is greater than
their ideal number of girls and is zero otherwise. Figures in parenthesis and square
brackets present the row and column percentages respectively.
Variation in the son preference of parents is reported in Table 2.3. Approximately 34 percent
of mothers and 35 percent of fathers in the sample report having a preference for sons. Parental
preferences match in 63 percent of the 4,900 households. Of those households, in 2,318 cases (47
percent) neither parent has a son preference while both parents have a son preference in 780 cases
(16 percent). In the remaining 1,802 households (37 percent), preferences do not match and either
the mother or the father has a son preference.
Appendix Table B.1 outlines some basic characteristics associated with son preference. House-
hold characteristics include higher probability of falling in the lower wealth quintiles as well as
greater number of children. Older age and lower educational attainment of both parents are found
to be associated with son preference. It can also be seen that parents with a son preference desire
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a greater ideal number of children.
2.4 Measuring Female Autonomy
For purposes of this analysis, female autonomy is defined as “the ability of women to make
choices/decisions within the household relative to their husbands” (Anderson and Eswaran 2009,
p.179). The NFHS asked adult male and female household members questions on decision making
on a number of household matters, namely, household purchases, own health care, visits to family
or relatives, and spending of spousal earnings. Household purchases were categorized into large
purchases and purchases made for daily needs of the household. The two types of purchases differ
on the amount of money to be spent and whether the purchase is routine or not: daily purchases
being more routine and requiring a relatively smaller amount of money to be spent than large
purchases (Kishor and Subaiya 2005).
The measure of status of female autonomy used in this paper is based on responses to the
decision making question on household purchase for daily needs, which is likely to be the most
directly relevant for investments in child nutrition. Fathers were asked about who they think the
decision making power should rest upon while mothers were asked about who actually takes the
decision in the household. Specifically, the question posed to the father was “Who do you think
should have the most say in making decisions on household purchases for daily needs?” while the
mother was asked “Who do you think has the most say in making decisions on household purchases
for daily needs?”
Table 2.4 reports parental responses to the decision making question. The father responds
whether the decision should be taken by himself (1,137 households, 23 percent), jointly with his wife
(1,975 households, 40 percent) or by his wife alone (1,788 households, 36.5 percent). The mother
responds whether the actual decision is taken by her husband (1,268 households, 26 percent), jointly
with her husband (1,472 households, 30 percent), by herself (1,456 households, 30 percent) or by
others (for instance, mother-in-law) in the household (566 households, 11.5 percent).11 These
11 The mothers’ responses do not add up to 100 percent due to 138 observations which have missing value.
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response categories provide variation in the status of female autonomy with decision making power
of the mother being the strongest when she takes (should take) the decision all by herself and
weakest when the decision is taken (should be taken) solely by her husband. When the couple
jointly takes a decision, female autonomy lies in between. Since identity and details on preferences
of the decision maker are not available when the mother responds that “others” take the decision,
observations for this category are excluded from the analysis based on the mother’s response.12
Table 2.4: Decision Making: Variation in Parental Response
Mothers’ response
Father Both Mother Others Missing Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Fathers’ response
Father 358 326 270 153 30 1,137
(31.49) (28.67) (23.75) (13.46) (2.64) (100.00)
[28.23] [22.15] [18.54] [27.03] [21.74] [23.20]
Both 517 662 535 209 52 1,975
(26.18) (33.52) (27.09) (10.58) (2.63) (100.00)
[40.77] [44.97] [36.74] [36.93] [37.68] [40.31]
Mother 393 484 651 204 56 1,788
(21.98) (27.07) (36.41) (11.41) (3.13) (100.00)
[30.99] [32.88] [44.71] [36.04] [40.58] [36.49]
Total 1,268 1,472 1,456 566 138 4,900
(25.88) (30.04) (29.71) (11.55) (2.82) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Notes: This is a cross tabulation of mothers’ and fathers’ responses to the decision making
question. Items in bold font reflect agreement in the parents’ responses. Figures in parenthesis
and square brackets present the row and column percentages respectively.
Two features are worth noting from the cross tabulation of parental responses presented
in Table 2.4. First, agreement of responses by both spouses on identity of the decision maker
is observed only in 1,671 (34 percent) households. In contrast, the frequency of agreement in
spousal responses is much higher for decisions related to other household matters, for example,
large household purchases (46 percent, statistics not reported). Second, in comparison to the
fathers’ report, mothers’ reports are skewed to portray a greater involvement of fathers in deciding
matters related to daily household needs. For example, among the 1,268 mothers who say that their
husbands are the sole decision makers, spouses of 358 of these mothers agree with this report while
the remaining 517 and 393 fathers think that it should be a joint decision or that only their wives
12 As a check, regressions are also estimated for this category but the coefficients are not found to be statistically
significant.
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should be involved in decision making. There are two potential explanations that can account for
this apparent difference in perceptions. One relates to the nature of the decision under analysis.
When exploring the decisions relating to large household purchases (statistics not reported), both
parents report a greater likelihood of the father being involved in decision making. This suggests
that in matters which are considered more important and involve the outlay of a larger sum of
money, fathers are less willing to entrust their wives with the power to make decisions than in the
case of relatively routine matters. The second explanation is that in a patriarchal society such as
India (as is evidenced by the majority (95 percent) of households in this sample being headed by
a male member), established norms might make women less likely to perceive that she could take
independent decisions that are not vetted by her spouse.
Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 summarize household and parental characteristics separately
by the fathers’ and mothers’ response to the decision making question. These descriptive statis-
tics reveal characteristics that are associated with the greatest level of female autonomy (father or
mother reporting that the mother should be (is) the sole decision maker). Household characteris-
tics include fewer children and lower probability of being in the lowest (poorest) wealth quintile.
Parental characteristics include high BMI of mother, greater likelihood of the mother being em-
ployed as well as older age and higher educational attainment of both parents. These accord well
with the correlates of female bargaining power from previous literature and validates the separate
measures of female autonomy based on the fathers’ and mothers’ reports that are used in this
analysis.
2.5 Empirical Specification
This paper first examines whether gender gaps in child nutrition are evident in the presence of
parental son preference and then tests if this relationship varies with the level of female autonomy.
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To answer these questions, the following regression specification is estimated.
yibs = α0 + α1Maleibs + α2MotherSonPrefis + α3FatherSonPrefis + α4(Maleibs ×
MotherSonPrefis) + α5(Maleibs × FatherSonPrefis) +Xisθ + φb + γs + ibs (2.1)
where y is the weight-for-height z score of child i of birth order b residing in state s. Maleibs
specifies the gender of the child. MotherSonPrefis and FatherSonPrefis are binary variables
which indicate if the mother or the father has a son preference. X is a vector of controls and
includes mother’s BMI, age of mother at childbirth, reported ideal number of children, educational
attainment, and dummies for work status of both parents, total number of children in the household,
dummy for female household head, and dummies for wealth quintile and religion. φb and γs
represent birth order and state fixed effects; these are included in all regressions to control for any
birth order and state level heterogeneity. The regressions are estimated first for the full sample and
then separately by who makes decisions in household purchases for daily needs, which are based on
the fathers’ and mothers’ reports. The estimation method is ordinary least squares.
The basic idea of the specification equation is thus to compare the outcomes of children
whose parents have a son preference to ones where they do not. The coefficients of interest are the
interaction terms between gender of the child and son preference of parents. α4 gives the difference
in gender gap in nutrition when the mother has a son preference compared to when she does not.
α5 gives the analogue when the father has a son preference.
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Results Based on Parental Preferences
The starting point of this analysis is to examine whether gender gaps in child nutrition are
observed when parents have a son preference compared to when they do not. The regression results
from estimating equation (2.1) for the full sample are reported in Table 2.5. The coefficient on the
Male dummy is statistically insignificant, which indicates the absence of a gender gap when neither
parent has a son preference. The average weight-for-height z score of female children is found to be
39
0.12 standard deviations lower when the mother has a son preference compared to when she does
not. Interestingly, this relation is not found when fathers have a son preference. The interaction
term of the child’s gender and the son preference of mother is positive, which indicates that a
gender gap exists when mothers have a son preference. However, the estimate is not statistically
significant.
Table 2.5: Results: Preferences and Child Nutri-
tion
Weight-for-height
(1)
Male (= 1) 0.0090
(0.040) )
Mother has son preference (= 1) -0.12**
(0.049)
Father has son preference (= 1) 0.022
(0.048)
Male * Mother has son preference 0.074
(0.062)
Male * Father has son preference -0.056
(0.066)
N 6,897
R2 0.091
Notes: This table presents the regression results for
equation (2.1) for the full sample of children. The de-
pendent variable is the weight-for-height z score of a
child. All controls are included but are not reported.
Excluded categories include birth order 1, wealth quin-
tile 1, Hindu religion, working father and non-working
mother. Robust standard errors clustered at the pri-
mary sampling unit level are reported in parenthesis.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
This result naturally raises the question of why only maternal preferences matter. A potential
explanation is that mothers are primarily responsible for feeding young children and therefore can
act on their preferences. Altering the quantity or quality of food are examples of how they might
manifest their preferences.
But is it true that the mother is always able to act upon her preferences? Or does her ability
to do so vary with the level of autonomy she enjoys in the household? The next two subsections seek
to answer these questions. A source of concern with such an analysis is the systematic under or over
representation of parental preferences across different autonomy levels. However, from Appendix
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Tables B.4 and B.5, this does not seem to be the case. Preferences are found to be distributed
across the different autonomy structures (considering both the fathers’ and the mothers’ response)
in approximately the same proportion as in the full sample.
2.6.2 Results Based on Fathers’ Response
To explore if the level of female autonomy has a bearing on the relationship between son
preference and child nutrition, regressions are estimated separately based on the fathers’ report
on who he thinks should make decisions in household purchases for daily needs. Table 2.6 reports
the estimation results of equation (2.1). The coefficient estimates on the Male dummy in all three
columns are found to be statistically insignificant, implying the absence of a gender gap when
neither parent has a son preference. In column (3), when the father thinks the decision making
power should rest on his wife (the mother), the average z score of female children is found to be 0.25
standard deviations lower when the mother has a son preference. The coefficient on the interaction
term Male*Mother has son preference indicates that the average z score of male children is 0.19
standard deviations higher than female children when the mother has a son preference compared to
when she does not. These results are not obtained in columns (1) and (2), where the father reports
that he alone or both he and his wife should participate in household decision making.13 In both
these cases, there appear to be no relation between son preference of parents and child nutrition.
As with the results for the full sample, reported in Table 2.5, the son preference of father plays no
significant role. This is true no matter who the father thinks the decision maker should be.
These results indicate that mothers are only able to manifest their preferences when they
have the sole power to make decisions on household purchases for daily needs but cannot do so
when the father wields his influence. The son preference of fathers, on the other hand, does not
matter even when he believes that he alone should be in charge of daily household purchases.
The cross tabulation of parental responses to the decision making question, presented in
13 The coefficient on Male*Mother has son preference, however, is not found to significantly differ across the three
groups.
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Table 2.6: Results: Fathers’ Response
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
(1) (2) (3)
Male (= 1) -0.00096 0.0040 0.041
(0.077) (0.061) (0.069)
Mother has son preference (= 1) -0.14 0.018 -0.25***
(0.094) (0.075) (0.082)
Father has son preference (= 1) -0.029 0.12 -0.037
(0.090) (0.076) (0.084)
Male * Mother has son preference -0.00040 -0.0026 0.19*
(0.13) (0.099) (0.11)
Male * Father has son preference 0.070 -0.070 -0.12
(0.13) (0.10) (0.11)
N 1,585 2,792 2,520
R2 0.131 0.099 0.098
Notes: This table presents the regression results for equation (2.1)
where the sample is stratified by the fathers’ response to the de-
cision making question. The dependent variable is the weight-for-
height z score of a child. All controls are included but are not re-
ported. Excluded categories include birth order 1, wealth quintile
1, Hindu religion, working father and non-working mother. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level
are reported in parenthesis.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table 2.4, attested to the low frequency of agreement in spousal responses as well as the greater
likelihood of mothers reporting involvement of fathers in decisions related to household purchases
for daily needs. In what follows, the analysis is repeated based on the mothers’ response to the
decision making question to examine if the difference in responses alters any of the above results.
2.6.3 Results Based on Mothers’ Response
Table 2.7 reports estimation results of equation (2.1) based on the mothers’ report. As
before, regressions are estimated separately for households where the father, mother or both parents
participate in decision making. Columns (1) and (3) reveal that when the father or the mother
is the sole decision maker, there is no baseline gender gap or variation in this gap depending on
whether the parents also have a son preference. However, results from column (2) indicate that the
son preference of mothers are associated with a gender gap when both parents participate in the
decision making process. The weight-for-height z score of the average female child is 0.11 standard
deviations lower when her mother has a son preference, although the coefficient is statistically
insignificant. The estimated coefficient on the interaction term Male*Mother has son preference
is 0.26, which suggests that the average gap in z scores between male and female children is 0.26
standard deviations when the mother has a son preference compared to when she does not.14
No statistically significant association is found between the son preference of fathers and child
nutrition outcomes. The result that it is only the preference of mothers that matter is consistent
with the previously reported results. The difference is observed in the autonomy structure in which
mothers are found to be able to manifest their preferences.
2.6.4 Discussion - Reconciling Results
Results from the above analyses confirm the existence of a significant association between
maternal son preference and gender bias in short run indicators of child nutrition. However, some
ambiguity is observed on the exact household decision making structure where mothers can act upon
14 The coefficient on Male*Mother has son preference is found to significantly differ across the three groups.
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Table 2.7: Results: Mothers’ Response
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
(1) (2) (3)
Male (= 1) -0.042 0.053 0.034
(0.076) (0.071) (0.076)
Mother has son preference (= 1) -0.070 -0.11 -0.12
(0.087) (0.093) (0.094)
Father has son preference (= 1) 0.063 -0.033 0.032
(0.086) (0.087) (0.090)
Male * Mother has son preference -0.10 0.26** 0.014
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Male * Father has son preference 0.015 -0.083 -0.077
(0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
N 1,806 2,089 2,018
R2 0.102 0.117 0.125
Notes: This table presents the regression results for equation
(2.1) where the sample is stratified by the mothers’ response to
the decision making question. The dependent variable is the
weight-for-height z score of a child. All controls are included
but are not reported. Excluded categories include birth order
1, wealth quintile 1, Hindu religion, working father and non-
working mother. Robust standard errors clustered at the pri-
mary sampling unit level are reported in parenthesis.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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their preferences. Based on the fathers’ response, this association is observed when mothers are
the sole decision makers while results based on the mothers’ response suggest that this association
exists when both parents are involved in making decisions.
One way to explain this apparent discrepancy is through the examination of the couples’
responses to the decision making question, which is presented in Table 2.4. As discussed before,
due to the routine nature of the decision and established gender roles in the society under analysis,
mothers are found to report far greater involvement of fathers in deciding matters related to daily
household needs. Therefore, it is not surprising that results based on the mothers’ response are
found in the “both” category as opposed to the “mother” category. Table 2.4 also indicates that
parental responses to the decision making question match in 1,671 (34 percent) households. Results
based on this subsample, where parental responses match, are presented in Appendix Table B.6.
The results resemble those based on the fathers’ response although the positive coefficient on
Male*Mother has son preference in column (3) is statistically insignificant.
There is another reason to place a greater emphasis on the results based on the fathers’
response. These responses are indicative of the degree of autonomy husbands are actually willing
to grant to their wives (Chakraborty and De 2011). Consequently, the husband’s perception likely
presents a more accurate picture of female autonomy, especially in a patriarchal society such as
India.
2.7 Interaction of Parental Preferences
The specification given by equation (2.1) examines the relationship between gender gaps in
child nutrition and son preference of each parent independent of the other parent’s preference.
Table 2.3 presents evidence that parental responses match in 3,098 households (63 percent) and do
not match in the remaining 1,802 households (37 percent). To analyze whether the matching of
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preferences matter, the following model with interaction of parental preferences is estimated.
yibs = β0 + β1Maleibs + β2MotherSonPrefis + β3FatherSonPrefis + β4(Mother
SonPrefis × FatherSonPrefis) + β5(Maleibs ×MotherSonPrefis) + β6(Maleibs
×FatherSonPrefis) + β7(Maleibs ×MotherSonPrefis × FatherSonPrefis)
+Xisθ + φb + γs + ibs (2.2)
where y is the weight-for-height z score of child i of birth order b residing in state s. As before,
MotherSonPrefis and FatherSonPrefis are binary variables which indicate if the mother or the
father has a son preference. X includes the same controls as in equation (2.1). φb and γs represent
birth order and state fixed effects.
β2 gives the mean difference in the nutrition outcome of female children when only the mother
has a son preference relative to the baseline case of neither parent having a son preference. β3 gives
the analogue when only the father has a son preference. β5 (β6) gives the difference in gender
gap in nutrition when only the mother (father) has a son preference compared to neither parent
having a son preference. The coefficient on the interaction of parental preferences, β4, gives the
differential influence on female outcomes of mothers having a son preference when fathers have a
son preference relative to when they do not. The triple interaction term, β7, gives the differential
influence on the gender gap.
The discussion in the previous section alludes to reasons why the fathers’ report might be a
more accurate representation of female autonomy in the household. Therefore, regressions results
for equation (2.2) are estimated based on the fathers’s response to the decision making question.
These results are reported in Table 2.8. Similar to Table 2.6, gender gaps are observed only in
column (3), where fathers report that their wives should be the sole decision makers. The coefficient
on Mother has son preference*Father has son preference is −0.44, which suggests that when fathers
have a son preference, the z scores of female children are 0.44 standard deviations lower if mothers
also have a son preference. The differential gender gap when both parents have a son preference is
0.48 standard deviations. Interestingly, the negative influence of mothers’ son preference on girls
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Table 2.8: Results: Interaction of Parental Preferences
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
(1) (2) (3)
Male (= 1) -0.034 -0.0026 0.085
(0.082) (0.065) (0.074)
Mother has son preference (= 1) -0.21* 0.034 -0.084
(0.11) (0.097) (0.10)
Father has son preference (= 1) -0.091 0.14 0.11
(0.11) (0.092) (0.10)
Mother has son preference * Father has son preference 0.17 -0.040 -0.44***
(0.18) (0.15) (0.17)
Male * Mother has son preference 0.12 0.017 0.0087
(0.17) (0.13) (0.13)
Male * Father has son preference 0.18 -0.051 -0.29**
(0.17) (0.13) (0.14)
Male * Mother has son preference * Father has son preference -0.30 -0.044 0.48**
(0.25) (0.20) (0.23)
N 1,585 2,792 2,520
R2 0.132 0.099 0.101
Notes: This table presents the regression results for equation (2.2) where the sample is strat-
ified by the fathers’ response to the decision making question. The dependent variable is the
weight-for-height z score of a child. All controls are included but are not reported. Excluded
categories include birth order 1, wealth quintile 1, Hindu religion, working father and non-
working mother. Robust standard errors clustered at the primary sampling unit level are
reported in parenthesis.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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is only to be found when fathers have a son preference but not when only the mother has a son
preference.15 The coefficient on Male*Father has son preference is −0.29, which implies that when
only fathers have a son preference, female children fare better than male children. This suggests
that mothers are able to protect female children against discrimination in nutrition investments
if she has no son preference and greater autonomy in the household. As before, no independent
association is found between child nutrition outcomes and father son preference.
2.8 Conclusion
Using separate reports from couples on their preference for sons and perceptions of status of
female autonomy in their household, this paper examines how the relationship between parental
son preference and gender gaps in child nutrition varies with the level of female autonomy. Using
data from the 2005 − 06 round of the NFHS, gender gaps in child nutrition are observed when
mothers have a son preference and are also involved in household decision making. In contrast,
no independent association is found between child nutrition outcomes and paternal preferences.
Overall, these results suggest that explicitly accounting for parental preferences may be important
when studying the dynamics of intra-household bargaining.
15 The coefficient on Male*Mother has son preference*Father has son preference is found to significantly differ
across the three groups.
Chapter 3
Women’s Partner Choices and Gender Relations
3.1 Introduction
A number of marriage types coexist in India. “Arranged marriage” is the predominant form
of marriage, where the arrangement is negotiated by the two families (Medora 2003).1 With
increasing urbanization, educational attainment, and exposure to modern ideas and influences,
there has been a growing tendency for families to consult and seek input from the young adults
themselves (Banerji, Martin, and Desai 2008). In some cases, families allow the potential partners
to communicate for a brief period so as to help them “decide whether they are suited for each
other and whether they like each other adequately to get married and spend the rest of their lives
together” (Medora 2003, p.218). Familial approval continues to be important even in self-arranged
marriages where individuals choose their own partners (Medora 2003).
The deep involvement of the family in arranged marriages implies that a great deal of emphasis
is placed on common family interests and inter-generational unity resulting in social, religious and
cultural similarities to form the basis of those matches (Medora 2003). Where individuals are
themselves involved in the final decision about their spouse, matches are more likely to be based
on personal relationship considerations (Banerji et al. 2008; Fox 1975). The first part of this paper
seeks to test these notions and investigates if partner characteristics differ depending on the extent
of a woman’s say in the choice of her partner. This is, to my knowledge, the first paper to examine
1 The perpetuation of this system has been attributed to the belief of many young Indian adults that they lack
the appropriate judgment and wisdom to find their own mates. Consequently, they leave this task up to their parents
who they believe to be the best suited for the task since they have raised them and know what is best for them (Jones
2010; Medora 2003).
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nationwide assortative mating patterns based on the extent of family involvement in the choice of
a woman’s partner in India.2 The decision about whom to marry influences a number of things,
one of which is the bargaining power of women after marriage. Higher relative bargaining power
of women in turn is associated with several favorable outcomes, for example, lower fertility levels
and greater investments in child health (Duflo 2003; Eswaran 2002; Thomas 1994). The next part
of this paper, therefore, explores the influence of the type of marriage arrangement on the decision
making power of women.
There is relatively little research on marriage types, especially at the national level, primarily
due to the lack of data.3 There are some studies on marriage patterns in specific regions. For
example, Banerjee et al. (2009) and Dugar et al. (2010) find that within-caste marriage is the norm
for arranged marriages in West Bengal, a state in eastern India. Using data from rural regions in two
states, Jejeebhoy and Halli (2005) have explored changes in marriage age, marriage-related decision
making, spousal age and educational differences, and dowry practices across different cohorts of
women.
The 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS) is the only nationally representative
survey to provide information on women’s involvement in the marriage and mate selection process.
Therefore, any nationwide study of marriage patterns would entail the use of this dataset. The
study by Banerji et al. (2008), for example, finds that increasing levels of education are associated
with greater autonomy in partner choice as more families seek the consent of the woman in the
choice of her partner. Additionally, they find that this trend towards autonomy is more pervasive
among younger cohorts of women. Using the same dataset, Banerji and Vanneman (2009) also
examine the relationship between marriage types and decision making power of women. They
construct an index of female autonomy from survey responses to decision making questions and
find that self-arranged marriages are the most empowering for women. My study differs primarily
2 Fox (1975) examines differences in marital homogamy and marital behavior across marriage types in Turkey.
His study found no difference in the extent of homogamy between love and arranged marriages, and little evidence
of an independent impact of marriage type on marital behavior.
3 Much of the economic literature on marriage in India has focused on dowry practices or the age at marriage
(Desai and Andrist 2010; Rao 1993).
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with the usage of a fixed effects model, inclusion of additional controls in the estimation equation,
and stratifying the analysis by urban-rural location of household. Estimating a model with state and
birth cohort fixed effects assists in controlling for unobserved state and cohort level heterogeneity
while the inclusion of additional controls allows us to better isolate the independent relationship
between marriage types and intra-household gender relations. Finally, the locational stratification
is justified based on the considerable variation in marriage patterns across these areas, which likely
stem from differential exposure to modern ideas and variation in educational composition.
Using data from the IHDS, the results from this analysis indicate that in arranged marriages,
women are more likely to marry someone from the same caste and someone at least as educated as
her. On the other hand, self-arranged marriages are more likely to match similarly aged individuals
and individuals from different castes. In contrast to Banerji and Vanneman (2009), this study finds
no strong evidence that women with the greatest autonomy in partner choice are the ones with the
greatest autonomy in making household decisions and decisions regarding their children. Instead,
bargaining power is found to be the highest among women involved in the choice of their spouse
together with their parents. The explanation offered in this paper is that self-arranged marriages
likely result in matches that are not approved by the parents and this lack of familial support leads
to the low bargaining power of these women.
3.2 Data
The data come from the 2005 India Human Development Survey (IHDS), a nationally rep-
resentative survey conducted in India.4 The survey covered approximately 33,500 ever-married
women who were asked questions on a variety of topics including education, mate selection, marital
history, and gender relations. This dataset provides the unique opportunity to study women’s in-
volvement in marriage related decision making since it is the only nationally representative dataset
to collect this information.
The sample is restricted to married Hindu women aged 20 − 49 years, who are currently
4 The IHDS is publicly available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/DSDR/studies/22626.
51
living with their husbands, and who have complete data on the variables used in the analysis.
Observations are further restricted to women who have been married only once and whose age of
marriage is between 12 and 24 years.5 The final sample size is 19,484 women.
Table 3.1 describes the sample characteristics of women and their spouses. The average
woman in an urban household is 33.5 years old, has an educational attainment of 7 years and
got married at the age of 18. The average urban spouse is 39 years old and has an educational
attainment of 9 years. The IHDS collected information on the degree of proficiency in speaking
English. Proficiency in English reflects elitist education associated with private schooling, which is
positively correlated with an individual’s exposure to modern ideas as well as high economic status
of parents (Banerji et al. 2008; Rana et al. 2005). Out of the 6,707 women in urban households, 74
percent report having no ability to speak English, 21 percent report being somewhat fluent and 5
percent report that they can converse fluently in English. Among their spouses, 60 percent are not
fluent, 30 percent are somewhat fluent and 10 percent are fluent in English. In rural households,
the average woman is 33 years old and has an educational attainment of 3 years. The average age
at marriage is 17 years. 92 percent of rural women do not speak English, 7 percent have limited
English speaking ability and 1 percent is fluent. The analogous distribution of English speaking
ability of their spouses are 82 percent, 16 percent and 2 percent. The average age and educational
attainment of rural spouses are 38 years and 6 years respectively. Column (5) reports the t statistics
of the difference in characteristics of women and men between urban and rural areas. All of these
are found to be statistically significant, which provides the justification for separating the analysis
by location of household.
Table 3.2 reports the age distribution of women in the sample. Out of the 6,707 women in
urban households, 2,294 women (34 percent) are between the ages of 20 − 29, 2,643 women (39
5 Since marriage processes vary considerably across religions, a generalized discussion would not be possible.
Therefore, the sample is restricted to Hindu households since the majority (81 percent) of the surveyed households
belong to the Hindu community. Observations on women who are widowed, divorced, separated or have absent
spouses are dropped since spousal information is either not collected or not complete for these women. This results
in the exclusion of 1,596 women. The restriction on marriage age leads to the further exclusion of 1,845 observations.
The rationale behind this exclusion is that the extent of involvement of women in the choice of their partner is
significantly different when women are much younger or older at the time of marriage (Banerji et al. 2008).
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Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Urban Rural t-stat
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. on diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Women
Age 33.48 7.68 32.85 7.68 5.51
Age at marriage 18.22 2.76 17.03 2.58 29.83
Years of education 6.89 5.00 3.37 4.13 52.32
English speaking ability
Not at all 0.74 0.92 -36.38
Little 0.21 0.07 29.42
Fluent 0.05 0.01 20.35
Men
Age 38.95 8.39 37.89 8.48 8.38
Years of education 8.99 4.55 5.82 4.66 45.46
English speaking ability
Not at all 0.60 0.82 -34.84
Little 0.30 0.16 23.59
Fluent 0.10 0.02 24.85
N 6,707 12,777
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percent) are between the ages of 30 − 39, and 1,770 women (26 percent) are between the ages of
40−49. In rural households, 4,586 women (36 percent), 5,181 women (41 percent) and 3,010 women
(24 percent) are in their 20’s, 30’s and 40’s respectively.
Table 3.2: Birth Cohorts of Women
Urban Rural
% of total N % of total N
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Birth Year: 1976-1985 34% 2,294 36% 4,586
(Cohort: 20-29 years)
Birth Year: 1966-1975 39% 2,643 41% 5,181
(Cohort: 30-39 years)
Birth Year: 1956-1965 26% 1,770 24% 3,010
(Cohort: 40-49 years)
Total 100% 6,707 100% 12,777
3.2.1 Marriage Types
The primary explanatory variable is marriage type. Following on Banerji et al. (2008),
marriages are categorized into four types based on the extent of a woman’s say in the choice of her
spouse. Ever-married women were asked two questions to elicit information on the mate selection
process. The first question asked was “Who chose your husband?”, to which women responded
that the choice was either made by herself, together with her parents, only by her parents or only
by “others”.6 If a woman responded that she chose her own husband, the marriage is labeled
as “arranged by woman alone”. If she responded that she chose her husband together with her
parents, the marriage is labeled as “jointly arranged by woman and parents”. Only where women
responded that their spouses were chosen by parents or others alone, a second question was asked.
These women were asked “Did you have any say in choosing him?” to which they responded “yes”
or “no”. If a woman’s spouse was chosen by parents or others and she had a say in choosing him,
then the marriage is labeled as “parent arranged with consent of woman”. If a woman’s response
to the second question was “no”, then the marriage is labeled as “parent arranged without consent
6 The “others” category refers to cases where extended family members or individuals outside the family played
a role in choosing the spouse (Banerji et al. 2008).
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of woman”. These four categories represent a range of marriage types starting from one in which
women make all the decisions to one in which their parents make all the decisions and they have
no say at all in the choice of their spouse.
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of marriage types. Among the 6,707 urban respondents, 325
women (5 percent) reported that they themselves chose their husband, 2,531 women (38 percent)
reported that they chose their husband together with their parents, 1,965 women (29 percent)
reported that their consent was sought when their parents arranged their marriage, and 1,886
women (28 percent) reported that their parents arranged their marriage without their consent.
The number of rural respondents reporting the four marriage types are 503 (4 percent), 4,881 (38
percent), 2,517 (20 percent) and 4,876 (38 percent) respectively. The prevalence of three of the four
marriage types are found to significantly differ between urban and rural areas. The distribution
of marriage types also indicates that urban women are more likely to be involved in the choice of
their spouse compared to their rural counterparts.
Table 3.3: Distribution of Marriage Types
Urban Rural t-stat
% of total N % of total N on diff.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Type 1: Arranged by woman alone 5% 325 4% 503 2.99
Type 2: Jointly arranged by woman and parents 38% 2,531 38% 4,881 -0.63
Type 3: Parent arranged with consent of woman 29% 1,965 20% 2,517 15.21
Type 4: Parent arranged without consent of woman 28% 1,886 38% 4,876 -14.06
Total 100% 6,707 100% 12,777
Appendix Table C.1 shows that the characteristics of women differ by the reported marriage
type. These descriptive statistics reveal that on average, a woman whose marriage was arranged
by her parents without her consent (Type 4) got married at a younger age, has a lower educational
attainment and a greater likelihood of not being able to converse in English compared to women
reporting other types of marriage. These patterns are observed among both urban and rural
respondents.
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3.2.2 Outcome Variables
There are five outcome variables used to examine the extent of assortative mating across the
four marriage types. These include age difference between a woman and her husband, indicator
for whether the husband grew up in the same village or town as the woman, indicator for whether
the husband belongs to the same caste as the woman, indicator for whether the economic status
of the husband’s family is at least similar to the woman’s family, and indicator for whether the
husband is at least as educated as the woman. Table 3.4 reports the raw means of these variables.
Age difference between couples is found to be the lowest in parent arranged marriages without the
consent of woman. Women who arrange their own marriage are more likely to marry someone who
grew up in the same village or town as her. The likelihood of a woman marrying someone at least
as educated as her or marrying someone whose family is economically at least as well off as her
family is higher when her parents are involved in the choice of her husband. Within-caste marriage
appears to be the norm when parents are involved in arranging the marriage. Women who arrange
their own marriage are less likely to choose someone from the same caste. The above mentioned
patterns are observed in both urban and rural households.
Table 3.4: Means: Variables Used to Analyze Partner Choices
Urban Households Rural Households
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Spousal age difference 5.46 5.52 5.84 5.02 5.16 5.14 5.77 4.55
Husband from same village 0.38 0.13 0.19 0.09 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.07
/town (= 1)
Husband from same caste (= 1) 0.78 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.90 0.97 0.97 0.97
Husband’s economic status at least 0.90 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.93
similar to woman’s
family (= 1)
Husband at least as educated as 0.77 0.82 0.81 0.89 0.82 0.89 0.83 0.92
woman (= 1)
N 325 2,531 1,965 1,886 503 4,881 2,517 4,876
Notes: This table reports the means of the variables used to examine differences in partner choices. The four marriage
types are: (1) Arranged by woman alone, (2) Jointly arranged by woman and parents, (3) Parent arranged with
consent of woman, and (4) Parent arranged without consent of woman.
Five variables are used to analyze the decision-making power of women across the different
marriage types. These are derived from survey questions on who in the household has the most
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say in decisions pertaining to what to cook on a daily basis, whether to purchase an expensive
item (such as refrigerator or television), how many children to have, what to do when a child
falls sick, and whom children should marry. Women responded if they themselves, their husbands,
a senior male member, a senior female member, or others were the primary decision makers. To
explore the extent of the woman’s autonomy in household decisions, binary variables are constructed
which have a value of one if the woman has the most say and zero if her husband, a senior male
member, senior female member or others have the most say.7 Thus, the decision making power
of women is examined both with respect to her husband and other elderly household members,
for instance mother-in-law. Table 3.5 reports the raw means of these variables across the different
marriage types. Not surprisingly, higher percentage of urban women report being the primary
decision maker compared to their rural counterparts. Another pattern observed in both urban
and rural households is that women in marriages arranged by parents without their consent have
lower decision-making power than women whose marriages are self-arranged, jointly arranged with
parents or arranged by parents with their consent.
Table 3.5: Means: Variables Used to Analyze Intra-Household Gender Relations
Urban Households Rural Households
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Woman has most say in
What to cook on daily basis (= 1) 0.82 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.77 0.71
Whether to purchase an expensive 0.15 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.04
item (= 1)
How many children to have (= 1) 0.27 0.18 0.24 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.16 0.14
What to do if child falls sick (= 1) 0.40 0.28 0.41 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.29 0.18
Whom children should marry (= 1) 0.16 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.04
N 296 2,389 1,803 1,749 473 4,559 2,384 4,668
Notes: This table reports the means of the variables used to analyze differences in intra-household gender relations.
The four marriage types are: (1) Arranged by woman alone, (2) Jointly arranged by woman and parents, (3) Parent
arranged with consent of woman, and (4) Parent arranged without consent of woman.
7 To examine the relation between gender relations and marriage types, Banerji and Vanneman (2009) used survey
responses to the last four decisions to construct an index of female autonomy. The index ranges from zero to four,
where a value of four indicates that the woman has the most say in all four decisions and a value of zero indicates
that she is not the primary decision maker in any of those decisions.
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3.3 Analysis of Assortative Mating Patterns
3.3.1 Empirical Strategy
This paper first examines whether assortative mating patterns differ across the four marriage
types. The regression specification to identify differences in partner choices is given below.
yics = α+
3∑
j=1
βjMarriageTypej,ics +Xicsθ + φc + γs + ics (3.1)
where y is a characteristic of the husband of woman i of birth cohort c in state s, MarriageType
specifies the type of marriage reported by a woman, and Xics is a vector of characteristics of women.
φc and γs represent ten-year birth cohort and state fixed effects.
8 The regressions are estimated
separately for urban and rural respondents.
The five dependent variables are (1) spousal age difference, (2) indicator for whether the
husband grew up in the same village or town as the woman, (3) indicator for whether the husband
belongs to the same caste as the woman, (4) indicator for whether the economic status of the
husband’s family is at least similar to the woman’s family, and (5) indicator for whether the
husband is at least as educated as the woman. Ordinary least squares is used for estimation when
spousal age difference is analyzed. Since the other dependent variables are all binary, the logit
model is employed.
Dummies for the three marriage types, arranged by woman alone, jointly arranged by woman
and parents, and parent arranged with consent of woman are included in the estimation equation.
The omitted category is parent arranged marriage without the consent of woman. The coefficients
βj trace out the average difference in partner characteristics between marriage type j and the
omitted marriage category.
Appendix Table C.1 attests to differences in age of marriage, educational attainment and
English speaking ability of women across the different marriage types. In general, these statistics
reveal that less educated women and women who marry young are those who are less likely to
8 Using 5-year birth cohorts instead of 10-year birth cohorts, I find remarkable similarity in the magnitude and
significance levels of the estimated coefficients on marriage types. I have also estimated the regressions separately for
women in their 20’s, 30’s and 40’s and find that the results are broadly similar across the cohorts.
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have a say in the choice of their spouse.9 Given this information, it becomes necessary to control
for the sorting of women with different characteristics into the different types of marriages so as
to try and isolate the independent influence of type of marriage arrangement on partner choices.
Therefore, Xics includes characteristics of women such as age at marriage, educational attainment,
and dummies for level of proficiency in speaking English.
Partner choices could also be dictated by the characteristics of a woman’s parents, their mar-
riage as well as the household she was raised in, particularly in arranged marriages. Unfortunately,
this information is not available from the IHDS.10 However, some of the controls included in the
estimation equation could serve as proxies for the same. As mentioned before, proficiency in En-
glish speaking is associated with private schooling, which in turn is positively correlated with high
economic status of parents (Rana et al. 2005). Again, due to the general patterns of migration
in India, a woman’s residence status (urban-rural location and state of residence) pre and post
marriage are highly correlated.11 Therefore, although the residence information was collected at
the time of interview (post marriage), it could well serve to indicate household characteristics at
the time of marriage.
3.3.2 Results
Table 3.6 presents the regression results from estimating equation (3.1) for urban households.
Of primary interest are the coefficients on the three marriage types, which give the average difference
in partner characteristics with respect to the omitted category, parent-arranged marriage without
the consent of woman. The results from column (1) indicate that women who arrange their own
marriage are more likely to marry someone who is closer to her age. The relevant point estimate is
−0.50, which indicates that spousal age difference is lower by 6 months. However, no statistically
9 Using data from Turkey, Fox (1975) found that “love matches” are more common than arranged marriages among
women from urban backgrounds, among women who married at older ages, and among more educated women.
10 An exception is the information collected for 424 married women (2 percent of total sample) who are currently
living with their parents instead of with their in-laws.
11 The 2001 Census estimates indicate that marriage is the pre-dominant reason of migration for women. Out of
the total female migrants, 87 percent migrated to other places within the same state. Even within the same state, 78
percent of the migrations were between urban and other urban areas or rural and other rural areas (Census of India
2001).
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significant difference in spousal age difference is found between the other types of marriages and
the omitted marriage category. The negative coefficients on the cohort dummies indicate a rising
trend towards finding similarly aged partners. Column (2) indicates that in all three marriage
types, women are more likely to marry someone who grew up in the same town or village. The
magnitude of the estimates suggest that this probability is highest for women arranging their own
marriage. Column (3) indicates that when a marriage is arranged by the woman alone, she is 16
percentage points less likely to marry someone from the same caste. Put differently, this suggests
that the probability of marrying someone from the same caste is higher in marriages where parents
are involved in the choice of the spouse. This result is consistent with findings from Banerjee
et al. (2009) and Dugar et al. (2010) who also find the strong prevalence of within-caste matches
in arranged marriages. Column (4) indicates the absence of any statistically significant difference
between the economic status of the woman’s family and her husband’s family across the different
marriage types. Column (5) indicates that the probability of a woman finding a partner who is
at least as educated as her is higher when the marriage is jointly arranged by the woman and
her parents or when the marriage is arranged by the woman’s parents with her consent. The
negative coefficients on the cohort dummies suggest that the odds of marrying someone at least as
educated have reduced for the younger cohorts. The coefficient on women’s educational attainment
is −0.029, which implies that educated women have a greater likelihood of marrying someone less
educated than them. However, the positive coefficients on the English speaking indicators imply
that educational hypogamy or marrying down with respect to education is less likely when women
are proficient in English.
The results for rural households echo the results from urban households and are reported in
Table 3.7. A difference is observed in the results for economic status, which is presented in column
(4). Women in all three marriage types are found to be more likely to marry into poorer families
in comparison to women in the excluded marriage category.
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Overall, these results are consistent with the perception that in arranged marriages, that
is when families are involved in the choice of a woman’s partner, matches are based mainly on
socioeconomic and educational similarities. This is indicated by the greater likelihood of a woman
marrying someone from the same caste and someone at least as educated as her. On the other
hand, in marriages arranged by the woman alone, matches are based on similarities in personal
characteristics of the partners at the time of marriage as is evidenced by a smaller age difference.
These marriages are also more likely to take place between individuals from the same town or
village, which would be the most probable way to find one’s own partner.
3.4 Analysis of Intra-Household Gender Relations
3.4.1 Empirical Strategy
Next, this paper examines the relationship between marriage types and intra-household gen-
der relations. To conduct this analysis, the following regression specification is estimated.
zics = α+
3∑
j=1
βjMarriageTypej,ics +Wicspi +Hicsψ +X
′
icsθ + φc + γs + ics (3.2)
where z is an indicator for whether the woman i of birth cohort c in state s is the primary decision
maker in decisions pertaining to (1) what to cook on a daily basis, (2) whether to purchase an
expensive item, (3) how many children to have, (4) what to do when a child falls sick, and (5)
whom children should marry. MarriageType specifies the type of marriage reported by a woman,
Wics is a vector of characteristics of women, Hics is a vector of characteristics of their husbands,
and X ′ics is a vector of other covariates. φc and γs represent ten-year birth cohort and state fixed
effects, and the regressions are estimated separately by urban-rural location of household.12 Due
to the binary nature of the dependent variables, the logit model is used for estimation.
As before, dummies for the three marriage types, arranged by woman alone, jointly arranged
by woman and parents, and parent arranged with consent of woman are included in the estimation
12 Using 5-year birth cohorts instead of 10-year birth cohorts, I find that the estimated coefficients on marriage
types are remarkably similar in magnitude and significance levels. I have also estimated the regressions separately
for women in their 20’s, 30’s and 40’s and find that the results are broadly similar across the cohorts.
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equation. The omitted category is parent arranged marriage without the consent of woman. There-
fore, the coefficients βj indicate if the decision making power of women differ between marriage
type j and the omitted category.
The ability of women to make household decisions might depend on several other factors,
which are included as controls in equation (3.2). The inclusion of these controls allows us to under-
stand if the type of marriage arrangement influences intra-household gender relations independent
of its correlation with these factors. Wics includes educational attainment and dummies for level of
proficiency in English, which are characteristics of women that might be correlated with the level of
autonomy she enjoys in her household. Similarly, Hics specifies husbands’ educational attainment
and level of proficiency in English. X ′ics includes other covariates such as years since marriage,
spousal age difference, dummy for whether the woman lives with her parents or alone with her
husband (this equals zero if she is living with her husband’s parents), dummy for whether the
economic status of the husband’s family is at least equal to the woman’s family, and a dummy for
membership in a high caste.
3.4.2 Results
Table 3.8 reports the regression results of equation (3.2) for urban households. Again, the
coefficients of interest are those on the three marriage types, which give the average difference
in decision making power of women compared to the omitted marriage category, parent arranged
without consent of woman. In three out of the five decisions, the estimates indicate no statistically
significant difference in the decision making power of women between the three marriage types and
the omitted marriage category. An exception is found in column (1), where the decision on what
to cook is analyzed. The point estimates suggest that in marriages jointly arranged by woman and
parents, and in parent arranged marriages with woman’s consent, women are 5 percentage points
and 4 percentage points less likely to be the primary decision maker compared to women in parent
arranged marriages without their consent. The coefficient on self-arranged marriages also carries a
negative sign, but it is not statistically significant. One way to interpret the negative coefficients
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is that it could imply the sharing of household duties and may actually be the sign of a more
egalitarian marriage. In the decision regarding what to do with sick child (column (4)), women in
parent arranged marriages with their consent are found to be about 8 percentage points more likely
to be the primary decision maker than women in parent arranged marriages without their consent.
The estimation results for rural households are presented in Table 3.9. Column (1) shows
that in self-arranged marriages and in marriages jointly arranged by a woman and her parents,
women are 6 percentage points and 5 percentage points less likely to have the most say in the
decision on what to cook on a daily basis. As discussed before, these negative coefficients likely
indicate the sharing of household duties. Column (5) shows that women in these same marriage
categories are 3 percentage points and 2 percentage points more likely to have a say in the decision
on whom children should marry compared to women whose marriages have been arranged by their
parents without their consent. The positive coefficients on all three marriage types in Columns (2)
and (4) suggest that these women have a greater say in decisions on whether to buy an expensive
item and what to do if a child falls sick. The coefficient on self arranged marriages, however, is not
statistically significant.
Overall, the results suggest that women in parent arranged marriages with their consent and
women in jointly arranged marriages are the ones with the greatest autonomy in making decisions.
Paradoxically, no strong evidence is found that self-arranged marriages are the most empowering
for women.13 One way to explain this apparent discrepancy is by examining the partner choices in
self-arranged marriages. Results from the previous section indicate that these marriages are more
likely to take place between similarly aged individuals and individuals from different castes, both
of which could result in these matches not being approved by the woman’s parents and family. The
absence of higher autonomy among these women likely stem from the lack of support from their
own family.
13 This is confirmed by individual tests of statistical significance between the coefficients on the three marriage
types.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper sets out to examine differences in partner choices across the different marriage
types prevalent in India and is the first paper to do so. The marriage types are categorized based
on the extent of a woman’s say in the choice of her spouse. The results confirm the perception
that in arranged marriages, that is when parents are involved in the choice of a woman’s partner,
the matches are based on socioeconomic and educational similarities. In these types of marriages,
women are found to be more likely to marry someone from the same caste and someone at least
as educated as her. In contrast, women who arrange their own marriages are more likely to marry
someone who is closer to her age and someone from a different caste.
Next, this paper seeks to examine differences in the extent of women’s autonomy in decision
making across the different marriage types. This autonomy is explored along a range of household
decisions and decisions regarding children. In contrast to Banerji and Vanneman (2009), decision
making power is found to be the highest among women involved in the choice of their spouse together
with their parents rather than among women in self-arranged marriages. A possible explanation
of this result is that women in self-arranged marriages lack family support due to the matches
not being approved by their families. This provides some suggestive evidence of the importance of
parental approval in the determination of post marriage bargaining power of women.
Of course, a complete discussion of the marriage market would entail considering both sides
of the market. Future research should look to examine partner choices and post marriage decision
making power from the perspective of men.
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Figure A.1: This figure shows the percentage change in mean ideal number of children and mean
ideal number of boys reported by all women in successive survey rounds. NFHS 1 was conducted
in 1992 − 93, NFHS 2 was conducted in 1998 − 99 and NFHS 3 was conducted in 2005 − 06.
Observations are restricted to women in rural households in wealth quintiles 1, 2 and 3.
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Table B.1: Parental and Household Characteristics: Stratification by Parental
Preferences
Mother has son preference Father has son preference
No Yes No Yes
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mother Characteristics
Age 27.05 5.65 27.49 5.82 26.72 5.51 28.10 5.97
Education 4.25 4.51 2.53 3.86 4.14 4.48 2.82 4.05
Worked in last year 0.41 0.42 0.41 0.41
Ideal no. of children 2.61 1.02 3.10 0.87 2.63 0.94 3.04 1.05
Ideal no. of boys 1.27 0.51 2.13 0.53 1.45 0.61 1.77 0.69
Ideal no. of girls 1.33 0.55 0.97 0.45 1.18 0.52 1.27 0.58
BMI 19.75 2.86 19.51 2.74 19.75 2.91 19.52 2.65
Father Characteristics
Age 32.30 6.52 32.08 6.66 31.83 6.47 32.97 6.66
Education 6.30 4.77 5.17 4.62 6.30 4.75 5.20 4.67
Worked in last year 0.97 0.96 0.97 0.97
Ideal no. of children 2.67 1.01 2.92 1.03 2.55 0.99 3.12 0.97
Ideal no. of boys 1.49 0.68 1.73 0.73 1.24 0.49 2.18 0.63
Ideal no. of girls 1.18 0.56 1.19 0.56 1.31 0.54 0.94 0.51
Household Characteristics
Wealth Quintile
1 0.21 0.33 0.21 0.32
2 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.28
3 0.26 0.23 0.26 0.23
4 0.19 0.12 0.18 0.13
5 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.04
Religion
Hindu 0.72 0.75 0.74 0.71
Muslim 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.12
Christian 0.15 0.11 0.13 0.13
Others 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
Male household head 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.96
Total no. of children 2.98 1.77 3.58 1.99 2.94 1.74 3.64 2.02
Number of households 3,250 1,650 3,188 1,712
75
Table B.2: Parental and Household Characteristics: Stratification by
Fathers’ Response
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother Characteristics
Age 26.75 5.53 27.26 5.72 27.43 5.81
Education 3.07 4.08 3.69 4.39 4.04 4.50
Worked in last year 0.40 0.41 0.43
Ideal no. of children 2.66 0.90 2.77 1.01 2.85 1.04
Ideal no. of boys 1.51 0.63 1.57 0.67 1.59 0.66
Ideal no. of girls 1.15 0.48 1.20 0.54 1.26 0.59
BMI 19.34 2.59 19.67 2.85 19.87 2.91
Father Characteristics
Age 31.83 6.29 32.22 6.42 32.49 6.87
Education 5.24 4.63 6.09 4.79 6.15 4.75
Worked in last year 0.97 0.96 0.97
Ideal no. of children 2.65 0.91 2.73 1.02 2.85 1.08
Ideal no. of boys 1.54 0.67 1.55 0.71 1.61 0.72
Ideal no. of girls 1.11 0.50 1.18 0.56 1.24 0.59
Household Characteristics
Wealth Quintile
1 0.31 0.24 0.22
2 0.30 0.28 0.26
3 0.22 0.24 0.28
4 0.14 0.17 0.17
5 0.04 0.07 0.07
Religion
Hindu 0.82 0.72 0.68
Muslim 0.11 0.11 0.09
Christian 0.05 0.13 0.19
Others 0.02 0.04 0.04
Male household head 0.96 0.95 0.95
Total no. of children 3.17 1.89 3.25 1.90 3.12 1.82
Number of households 1,137 1,975 1,788
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Table B.3: Parental and Household Characteristics: Stratification by
Mothers’ Response
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mother Characteristics
Age 27.31 5.71 27.68 5.72 28.38 5.64
Education 2.88 4.06 3.79 4.44 3.96 4.40
Worked in last year 0.40 0.40 0.46
Ideal no. of children 2.66 0.91 2.84 1.02 2.94 1.11
Ideal no. of boys 1.53 0.64 1.59 0.65 1.63 0.70
Ideal no. of girls 1.13 0.49 1.26 0.58 1.31 0.61
BMI 19.29 2.67 19.70 2.85 19.99 2.97
Father Characteristics
Age 32.22 6.35 33.04 6.54 33.51 6.48
Education 5.37 4.60 5.72 4.79 5.91 4.76
Worked in last year 0.97 0.97 0.97
Ideal no. of children 2.64 0.95 2.82 1.05 2.93 1.14
Ideal no. of boys 1.51 0.67 1.61 0.72 1.66 0.76
Ideal no. of girls 1.13 0.50 1.21 0.58 1.27 0.63
Household Characteristics
Wealth Quintile
1 0.30 0.28 0.21
2 0.29 0.28 0.28
3 0.24 0.23 0.27
4 0.12 0.16 0.18
5 0.05 0.06 0.06
Religion
Hindu 0.80 0.71 0.64
Muslim 0.13 0.09 0.09
Christian 0.05 0.16 0.23
Others 0.02 0.04 0.05
Male household head 0.96 0.97 0.95
Total no. of children 3.40 1.96 3.27 1.88 3.39 1.88
Number of households 1,268 1,472 1,456
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Table B.4: Distribution of Parental Preferences: Stratification by Fathers’
Response
Father has son preference
No Yes Total
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Decision Maker, Father
Mother has son preference
No 527 222 749
(70.36) (29.64) (100.00)
[72.89] [53.62] [65.88]
Yes 196 192 388
(50.52) (49.48) (100.00)
[27.11] [46.38] [34.12]
Total 723 414 1,137
(63.59) (36.41) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Panel B: Decision Maker, Both
Mother has son preference
No 938 359 1,297
(72.32) (27.68) (100.00)
[72.43] [52.79] [65.67]
Yes 357 321 678
(52.65) (47.35) (100.00)
[27.57] [47.21] [34.33]
Total 1,295 680 1,975
(65.57) (34.43) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Panel C: Decision Maker, Mother
Mother has son preference
No 853 351 1,204
(70.85) (29.15) (100.00)
[72.91] [56.80] [67.34]
Yes 317 267 584
(54.28) (45.72) (100.00)
[27.09] [43.20] [32.66]
Total 1,170 618 1,788
(65.44) (34.56) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Notes: This table presents the distribution of son preference of parents where the
sample is stratified by the fathers’ response to the decision making question. Son
preference for either parent is calculated as a binary variable which equals one if the
parent reports that their ideal number of boys is greater than their ideal number of
girls and is zero otherwise. Figures in parenthesis and square brackets present the
row and column percentages respectively.
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Table B.5: Distribution of Parental Preferences: Stratification by Moth-
ers’ Response
Father has son preference
No Yes Total
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Decision Maker, Father
Mother has son preference
No 595 218 813
(73.19) (26.81) (100.00)
[71.26] [50.35] [64.12]
Yes 240 215 455
(52.75) (47.25) (100.00)
[28.74] [49.65] [35.88]
Total 835 433 1,268
(65.85) (34.15) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Panel B: Decision Maker, Both
Mother has son preference
No 669 304 973
(68.76) (31.24) (100.00)
[71.47] [56.72] [66.10]
Yes 267 232 499
(53.51) (46.49) (100.00)
[28.53] [43.28] [33.90]
Total 936 536 1,472
(63.59) (36.41) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Panel C: Decision Maker, Mother
Mother has son preference
No 716 289 1,005
(71.24) (28.76) (100.00)
[75.13] [57.46] [69.02]
Yes 237 214 451
(52.55) (47.45) (100.00)
[24.87] [42.54] [30.98]
Total 953 503 1,456
(65.45) (34.55) (100.00)
[100.00] [100.00] [100.00]
Notes: This table presents the distribution of son preference of parents where the
sample is stratified by the mothers’ response to the decision making question. Son
preference for either parent is calculated as a binary variable which equals one if the
parent reports that their ideal number of boys is greater than their ideal number of
girls and is zero otherwise. Figures in parenthesis and square brackets present the
row and column percentages respectively.
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Table B.6: Results: Matching Response
Decision Maker in HH
Father Both Mother
(1) (2) (3)
Male (= 1) -0.067 -0.0027 0.076
(0.15) (0.10) (0.12)
Mother has son preference (= 1) 0.092 0.023 -0.34**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Father has son preference (= 1) -0.16 -0.066 -0.14
(0.15) (0.13) (0.14)
Male * Mother has son preference -0.036 0.20 0.21
(0.21) (0.18) (0.20)
Male * Father has son preference 0.0086 -0.0058 -0.15
(0.22) (0.17) (0.20)
N 502 949 918
R2 0.179 0.144 0.134
Notes: This table presents the regression results for equation
(2.1) based on the subsample where parental responses to the
decision making question match. The dependent variable is the
weight-for-height z score of a child. All controls are included
but are not reported. Excluded categories include birth order
1, wealth quintile 1, Hindu religion, working father and non-
working mother. Robust standard errors clustered at the pri-
mary sampling unit level are reported in parenthesis.
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1.
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Table C.1: Characteristics of Women by Marriage Type
Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A: Urban
Age at marriage 18.95 2.87 18.55 2.70 18.65 2.73 17.19 2.58
Years of education 7.86 4.77 7.55 5.00 7.89 4.78 4.78 4.64
English speaking ability
Not at all 0.71 0.71 0.67 0.86
Little 0.23 0.22 0.27 0.13
Fluent 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01
N 325 2,531 1,965 1,886
Panel B: Rural
Age at marriage 17.66 2.67 17.29 2.58 17.67 2.62 16.37 2.41
Years of education 4.34 4.58 3.48 4.18 4.91 4.43 2.38 3.56
English speaking ability
Not at all 0.89 0.93 0.87 0.95
Little 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.04
Fluent 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
N 503 4,881 2,517 4,876
Notes: The four marriage types are: (1) Arranged by woman alone, (2) Jointly arranged
by woman and parents, (3) Parent arranged with consent of woman, and (4) Parent
arranged without consent of woman.
